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Abstract
This thesis explores the mainstream media's role in the
development of the United States nuclear power program and its deference to
the pro-nuclear agenda of government and industrial elites. It also provides a
concrete example of how the media operated in disseminating pro-nuclear
information to the general public, through its coverage of the accident at Three
Mile Island and current nuclear issues.
The debate concerned with public policy issues and the utilization
of nuclear power for electrical generation arose from the Federal Government's
economic as well as political involvement in the promotion and regulation of
nuclear technology development. Although the political issues surrounding
nuclear power itself have evolved since the first prototype went into operation,
issues obscured through the media such as plant safety and regulation continue
to be salient.
The evolution of nuclear power essentially falls into three phases
which are defined by the growth of a propaganda system in which media,
political, and industrial actors cooperate in framing public information to
support a pro-nuclear consensus. The exploration of this thesis will be as
follows: a discussion of a three phase life-cycle of nuclear power; the first phase
being delineated by legislation and economic forces; the second, describing
nuclear power commercialization and developing externalities; and the third
exploring the media's role in the endorsement of the government's pro-nuclear
agenda through a case study of the accident at TMI and more recent nuclear
developments. The conclusions of this thesis find the resilience of the
1
nuclear propaganda system to be virtually unaffected by set-backs of the last two
decades, as government and industrial nuclear supporters attempt to rejuvenate
popular support. Whether the third phase of the nuclear life-cycle will result in
nuclear power's demise or its rebirth will depend upon two things: 1) public
recognition of the media, government, and industry complex, and 2) their ability
to effectively breach the propaganda system.
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Introduction
Development and implementation of nuclear energy technology
has been economically supported by the Federal Government and promoted by
the media since commercial nuclear efforts began after World War II. Nuclear
power, throughout its history was extolled by government officials and reported
in the mainstream media as an energy source that promised to be a lucrative
investment for large corporations, utilities, and the country as a whole. The
employment of nuclear technology for the production of electric energy in the
United States has been a topic of heated debate in many arenas, since the start-
up of the first nuclear plant in 1957. This debate has flourished over the years
among scientists, government leaders, policy makers, economists, academicians,
utility owners and environmentalists. While the debate ranges widely, this
thesis focuses on media promotion of the government/industry pro-nuclear
agenda, especially during the most recent phase of its development.
By viewing the development of nuclear power in three phases;
1945-1962, the development of nuclear power legislation and regulation; 1964-
1977, the commercialization of nuclear power end developing externalities; and
from 1978 onward, including the media's coverage of the accident at Three Mile
Island, one can gain a greater understanding of how the mainstream media
function as a promotional arm of the federal government, disseminating pro-
nuclear information to the general public in order to garner popular support and
forego critical discussion. Throughout the three phases of the nuclear life-cycle,
informed and interested groups of individuals, government officials, big
business, and big media have worked in aggregate to form a tightly woven
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network of powerful elites acting to obscure important information about
nuclear power from the general public. It is the endeavors of these interested
parties, prior to the accident at TMI, that promoted an atmosphere in which
public understanding of the accident and the multifaceted issues surrounding
nuclear power was stymied.
The mainstream media's coverage of the accident at TM! and
ensuing media discussion provides an excellent case study of how the media
defer to official government and scientific sources which support a pro-nuclear
political agenda. At first glance, the accident at TM! and the ensuing media
coverage appears to have brought the issues of nuclear power to the public
forum and under closer governmental scrutiny. But, upon closer inspection of
the media's coverage of TM! and more recent developments consistant with its
role in the historic development of nuclear power, one can see how the media
supported the pro-nuclear agenda set by members of the government/industrial
complex. Before an actual analysis of the historic development of the
government's nuclear agenda can be conducted and the accident at TM! and its
media coverage can be examined in the context of a propaganda system, one
must understand the underlying framework which supports such a system.
British scholar J.A.C. Brown (1963) has described, along with
numerous other authors, the underlying purpose of propaganda. Whether it is
utilized by a government or group for domestic or foreign functions,
propaganda seeks to influence people's minds and attitudes in favor of hidden
agenda issues by foregoing serious public debate. l The propagandist, rather
1 J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to
Brainwashing (Baltimore, MD: Penguine Books, 1963). p. 12.
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than initiate inquiry or controversy, only allows for dialogue in which
preconstructed answers are known in advance or arguments which support the
agenda are widely realized and accepted.
For propaganda to work, it must coexist in an atmosphere of
technological advancement;
Only in the technological society can there be anything of the type and
order of magnitude of modem propaganda, which is with us forever; and
only with all-pervading effects that flow from the propaganda can the
technological society hold itself together and further exist.2
A technological society bases that society's advancement upon scientific facts and
figures relying upon man's need to worship these facts because they supply for
him some tangible proof of reality. Such a society integrates man into it by
sending him reinforcing messages that attach themselves to man's preexisting
beliefs and attitudes. In this society, man becomes excited over every new
technological development because this is evidence that he is progressing, and
progress is good.
Man accepts facts as the ultimate reality. He believes that facts in
themselves provide evidence and proof, and he willingly subordinates
values to them, he obeys what he believes to be necessary, which he
somehow connects with the idea of progress. This stereotyped ideological
attitude inevitably results in a confusion between judgements of
probability and judgements of value. Because fact is the sole criterion, it
must be good.3
Propaganda relies upon such pervasive beliefs, not concerning
itself with what is good for man, but what man believes to be good for himself.
Facts presented to man by figures of authority or power, such as government
2 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda, The Formation of Men's Attitudes (New
York: Random House, 1965). p. v.
3 Ellul, 1965. p. xv.
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officials, corporate executives, academics, and scientists, dealing with society's
progress are not considered to be value laden because through such proof, man's
belief in the goodness of progress is reinforced. These aspects of man's belief
system allow propaganda campaigns to be successfully initiated. The purpose of
propaganda campaigns is to indoctrinate the individuals in our society to serve
as unwitting supporters of the policies and practices which are obscured from
common view by those with power and authority. The development and
promotion of nuclear power in the United States is a glaring example of how a
propaganda campaign successfully convinced the United States public that
nuclear power was a 'good' technological advancement allowing our society to
progress.
The technological base from which the 'peaceful atom' was derived,
spawned from the atom's destructive use. This destructive capability was an
advancement deployed for use in war. In the wake of public understanding of
the destructive nature of the technology, the government had to devise a way in
which society would accept the utility of a demonstrably negative progress. By
attaching the word 'peace' to the atom's new found potential for electrical
generation, society could breathe easier with the knowledge that their
government could produce good from bad while continuing to protect and
enhance their standard of living. Thus, once a declaration of the atom's peaceful
intent was well accepted, by the public, as decidedly 'good', (1945-1962) its
progress was undaunted.
Ellul (1965) states that, "propaganda must be based on some truth
tha t can be said in a few words and is able to linger in the collective conscience."4
4 Ellul, 1965. p.57.
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By coining the phrase 'peaceful atom' the government proposed to the public
through suggestion, that peace was to be the new primary focus of atomic
technology. This masked the more important governmental role of the
atom for weapons production. Later, when electrical generation from the atom
was viable (1963-1977), AEC chairman Lewis Strauss suggested through new
phrases that atomic power would be 'too cheap to meter' and that unlike fossil
fuels it was 'clean and cheap.'
It is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in their homes
electrical energy too cheap to meter.s Atomic power will transform the
appearance of your home town. If you live in a community darkened by
grime and afflicted with smog from power plant or factory smokestacks,
you can look forward to seeing your town transformed into a clean,
healthful place. Atomic furnaces, unlike coal furnaces, use no
smokestacks.6
These phrases did linger in the collective conscience with their intent and
veracity unquestioned. This is evidenced by the lack of public inquiry about
nuclear power in the early years of development. In order to forego critical
assessment of nuclear power's development in its formative years, all the
government had to do was provide enough reinforcing 'facts' to sustain the
virtue of this technological progress.
Facts unable to reach mass audiences render those audiences
ineffectual in countering the government's efforts to gain public allegiance to a
propaganda campaign. Mass media provide the means by which select facts are
S William A. Gamson et al., "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach," American Journal of Sociology
Vol. 95:1 Guly 1989). p.13.
6 Harry 1. Fisher, former president of the Americal Chemical Society.
Quoted in; David 1. Sills et al. Accident at Three Mile Island (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1982). p.97.
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filtered, framed and disseminated to the public, marginalizing dissent and
allowing the government to dominate private economic interests.7 The sources
of facts from which the media draw their information is regularly provided by
'experts' whose work is funded and approved by the agents of power. The mass
media's role in influencing and forming public opinion is well recognized by
those in industry as well as academia. It is the combination of the government's
manipulation of scientific and technological information and the media's
reliance upon such information which support specific policy agendas and the
dissemination of one-sided information packages. To illustrate this point,
consider the following package presented on the progress of nuclear power by
the Atomic Industrial Forum:
If the electric chair had been invented before the electric light, would we
still be using kerosene lamps? There has always been resistance to
technological progress by nervous Nellies who see only the problems and
ignore the benefits. Resistance to nuclear energy development is the latest
version of this irrational fear of progress and change, the expression of
modern pastoralists and nuclear Luddites. Certainly nuclear energy
development is not free of problems, but problems can be solved, as the
history of technological progress shows. The failure to develop nuclear
power will retard our economic growth and make us renege on our
obligation to the poor and to future generations. If coercive utopians
prevent us from moving ahead now with nuclear energy, the next
generation is likely to be sitting around in the dark blaming the utilities
for not doing something this generation's officials would not let them
do. 8
Not only does this package neatly provide a pro-nuclear frame of reference, but
it also preys upon the 'good of progress' theme mentioned earlier. It presents
7 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent (New
York: Pantheon, 1988). p.2.
8 Quoted in, Robert Nisbet, "The Rape of Progress," Public Opinion Vol
2. (Feb. 6, 1979). p.55.
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partially framed information by stating that nuclear power's adoption by society
will provide a means of solving the ills of poverty. A false claim that does
nothing more than make an emotional appeal and connot be proved. The
package also refers to the necessity of nuclear adoption for the benefit of our
progeny, inferring that if nuclear power is not adopted, future generations will
not have sound economic lives. This statement is extremely misleading because
what has been left for future generations from the adoption of nuclear power is
the huge economic and environmental burden of radioactive waste disposal.
Through the presentation of information by these means, the public is
disinclined to question their truth or ambiguity. The mainstream media by
design, provide no clues as to which facts should be relied upon as reality, nor
do they give the public the capability to judge the conflicting information
provided by reliable sources.
The Herman and Chomsky propaganda model concisely defines
how the mainstream media act in support of the government's hidden agenda to
garner public support for its policies, creating the 'necessary illusions' of a
democracy. Benjamine Ginsberg as quoted by Chomsky, has stated that this is a
democracy which includes
...market mechanisms to regulate popular perspectives and sentiments.
The "marketplace of ideas built during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, effectively disseminates the beliefs and ideas of the upper
classes while subverting the ideological and cultural independence of the
lower classes. Through the construction of this marketplace, western
governments forged firm and enduring links between socioeconomic
position and ideological power, permitting upper classes to use each to
buttress the other...In the United States, in particular, the ability of the
upper and upper-middle classes to dominate the marketplace of ideas has
generally allowed these strata to shape the entire society's perception of
9
political reality and the range of realistic political and social possibilities.9
The Herman and Chomsky propaganda model proposes how information,
presented through the mainstream media is framed to through a series of five
filters, focusing on the inequalities of wealth and power in our society.
These filters fall underthe following headings: (1) the size concentrated
ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-
media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass
media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by
government, business and "experts" funded and approved by these
primary sources and agents of power; (4) "flak as a means of disciplining
the media; and (5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control
mechanism. These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The
raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only
the cleansed residue fit to print. lO
Author's Lee & Solomon (1991) assert that the manipulation of information, due
to these forces, is especially prevalent when the media reports on matters
concerned with public health, safety, and the environment. 11 Nuclear power and
its related issues fit a propaganda campaign like a hand-in-a-glove. The nuclear
power campaign involved government initiation and economic support,
technological innovation, business adoption, media support through filtering of
information, and public complacency. The ramifications of public blindness to
the nuclear campaign are manifested in the accident at TMI, which did not
'expose' the propaganda system, but rather perpetuated its continued acceptance.
When inquiring into the particular aspects of nuclear power which
enabled it to mature without much inclusion of public debate, one need only
9 Benjamine Ginsberg as quoted in Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions
(Boston, MA: South End Press, 1989). p. 7.
10 Herman and Chomsky, 1988. p. 2. To gain agreater understanding of
how these filters interact, see Chapter 1 of this source.
11 Martin Lee and Norman Soloman. Unreliable Sources (New York:
Carol Publishing, 1991). p.202.
10
look as far as the government/industrial installation that formulated its
development. It is a fact that large corporations, the likes of GE and
Westinghouse have been and continue to be the largest corporations involved
with nuclear power and atomic weapons production. Ralph Nader, anti-nuclear
advocate once stated, that if these corporations owned the sun, the Unites States
would have solar power instead of nuclear power. It should not be surprising,
then, to learn that these two corporations are extremely diversified and although
they don't own the sun they do extend their economic reach into the mainstream
media.
GE is the owner of RCA, which owns the NBC network, and
Westinghouse owns major television-broadcasting stations, a cable
network, and a radio station network. Both corporations are huge,
diversified, multinational companies heavily involved in the controversial
areas of weapons production and nuclear power.12
Since executive personnel in these corporations have been bank trustees and
government officials, it is also true that their interests will be carried with them
to these and other corporate boardrooms. ''The mass media are drawn into a
symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic
necessity and reciprocity of interests."13 Although this is a more recent analysis
of the interests which are large contributors to the propaganda system, it can be
deduced that little has changed since nuclear power got its start.
The Nuclear Power Life Cycle
The development of the nuclear political agenda evidenced in the
first phase of its life-cycle through documentation of government financial
12 Herman and Chomsky, 1988. p.12.
13 Ibid., p. 18.
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support and industrial cooperation carried over from the war efforts to develop
the atomic bomb. During these years, 1945 - 1962, legislation was instituted to
secure the steady transition of nuclear technology from the military to the
civilian domain. Once legislation was in place for regulation procedures, and
the first proto-type plants were on-line, commercial employment of nuclear
power began to climb throughout 1963 and the early 1970's. During this time,
large businesses and utilities had been convinced through Government efforts
and the media, to invest extensive amounts of capital into this form of electrical
generation. Although numerous orders for nuclear generating plants (Light
Water Reactors such as, Pressurized Water Reactors, PRW and Boiling Water
Reactors, BWR) had been made during the late 70's, the cost of setting up an
operational plant became almost prohibitive. Cost escalation was due to utilities'
recognition that the true economic costs of building a plant had been distorted
by the unrealistic price setting of the 'turnkey' plants along with active public
opposition to nuclear power. The 'turnkey' plants gave an unrealistic economic
profile of the potential financial gains that utilities could expect. The
corporations who sold the first plants to utilities, took a financial loss by
establishing a set price for the plants which was lower than their actual cost.
This price grew, as the preset bidding ceased. As of 1978, new orders for
reactors came to a halt and none have been ordered since that time.
Immediately following the decline in orders and investment in
power plants, the accident at Three Mile Island, in Middletown, PA near
Harrisburg occurred on March 28, 1979. This accident was reported to be the
worst nuclear accident on record in the world at that time, and was covered
extensively by the mainstream media for more than two years. It is ironic that
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the state which witnessed the first operation of an electrical nuclear power plant
prototype in 1957, was also the state that experienced the industry's worst
accident. After this accident, the nuclear industry was 'scrutinized' by the
American public. Greater attention was paid to the government procedures and
regulations involved with nuclear power, utility control of plant operations, and
health, safety and technical issues central to plant operations in the United
States. After the accident at TMI, another, more devastating accident at the
Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Soviet Union occurred in 1986. The affects of this
accident coupled with the declining public support of nuclear power in the U.S.
resulting from TMI, appeared to have solidified the decline of nuclear
power in the United States. Another factor which contributed to the declining
phase of the nuclear power life cycle has been the issue of nuclear waste. The
public has begun to recognize that the waste produced from the operation of
these plants is highly radioactive and that it needs to be disposed of in a safe
manner. Currently, there is no safe method for disposing of this waste.
The descent of the United States nuclear program was due to the
latent affects of TMI such as, the marginal financial returns received by plant
owners and nuclear investors, and public concern over the questions raised
about the safety of nuclear power here in our own country. Since the time of
these two accidents, a number of plants that had been ordered and planned for
start-up in the late 1980's did not meet this goal. The Shoreham Plant in New
York was abandoned, and the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire was delayed
due to public outcry and mobilization, and increased plant safety requirements.
In the 1990's the government/industry/media conglomerate are
attempting to kick-off a new nuclear campaign. Conditions for the success of
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new pro-nuclear campaign are beginning to blossom, due to developments such
as the war in the Persian Gulf which has again attracted the nation's attention to
U.S. dependency on foreign energy supplies. Public concern over U.S. energy
dependency upon fossil fuels has coalesced with a concern over the depletion of
the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect due to electrical generation from such
plants. As a consequence of these concerns, the environmental movement has
had a resurgence. Government and industry representatives as well as the
media are slowly promoting nuclear energy once again, as an environmental
energy source, proclaiming that it is a 'cleaner and greener' form of electrical
generation.
The paper that follows tests the hypothesis that a system of nuclear
propaganda was created by government involvement in and economic backing
of nuclear power and that the media played an indispensable role in the
development and promotion of the technology. It is this aspect of the media and
its historic coverage of nuclear issues which became more evident in the accident
at TMI, solidifying a third phase of the nuclear power life-cycle in the U.S.
14
Chapter 1
Historic Development of Nuclear Power:
Phase One of the Life-Cycle 1945 - 1962
Introduction
In order to understand the evolution of government involvement in
the development of nuclear power in the United States and the nuclear
propaganda system, one must look at the origins of the country's atomic
programs. The historic and legislative development of nuclear power reviewed
here is by no means complete because certain aspects of nuclear power such as
uranium mining and milling and international issues are not addresses. The
issues which later develop coincide with the evolving complexity of this political
technology and public concern over previously neglected nuclear issues. This
chapter reviews the planting of the nuclear power seeds and their protective
nurturing by the federal government.
The effort to develop nuclear fission as a cheap and reliable source
of energy has been one of this century's most important planned efforts by the
Federal Government to alter society by confounding the(femocratic process and
neglecting to include public decisions in the development and regulation of a
dangerous technology. The nuclear propaganda campaign has been controlled
by elite groups of government funded scientists and engineers with an
intellectual stake in its success, an assortment of government officials and
organizations, major corporations with a financial stake in its proliferation, along
with the cooperation of the mainstream media.l4
14 Irvin C. Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, The Failed Promise of Nuclear
Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p.179.
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Atomic power was born with the arms race and the utilization of
this power originated through the United States military's development and
deployment of the atomic bomb. It has been stated by numerous authors that
atomic technology has been one of the greatest achievements of human scientific
effort throughout history and one with the greatest potential for self-destruction.
The U.S. nuclear weapons development program was carried out
in virtual secrecy. This program was established under the auspices of the Army
in the early 40's and was called the Manhattan Engineering District (MED),
better known as the Manhattan Project. At this time the existence of the MED
was not known by the general public for military reasons. Its sole purpose was
directed toward the rapid research and development of the atomic bomb. The
Army was given complete control over the project which included: construction
of facilities, operations, information, developments, and security. The
government had absolute control of the atom from the very beginning. IS
Because of the government control of atomic development from its origins, the
later 'peaceful' application of this technology was also controlled and subsidized
by the government.
Through the diligent efforts of the U.S. Army's MED the atomic
bomb was devised. Under the leadership of President Harry Truman, the first
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, August 6, 1945 and three days
following, a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The war was won and
two devastated Japanese cities felt the effect of U.S. harnessed technology.
After the war, the government had amassed a stockpile of weapons
15 Frank G. Dawson, Nuclear Power, Development and Management of a
Technology. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976). p.14.
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facilities, and uranium enrichment plants. Through the concerted efforts of
personnel in the government and military sectors, an organized structure was
created for conducting atomic research. Commercial contracts were made by the
government with large civilian corporations for the building of atomic facilities.
There was also a consortium of scientists, engineers and other trained personnel
who had been involved with research and development related to wartime
(
efforts. 16 The impetus to continue atomic R&D resulted from this organization.
In an effort to secure the refinement of atomic weapons, the government devised
a program which would cloak weapons research from public view, gain public
acceptance for more honorable atomic endeavors and also stimulate a wide
range of industries. These interests prompted the U.S. government and
supportive scientists to construct a program for the 'peaceful application' of the
atom. By promoting the benefits of peaceful atomic applications to the public,
the government was able to assure U.S. military superiority while providing the
public with a more acceptable use nuclear technology.
Construction of the AEC and Legislation
In order to facilitate commercial applications for nuclear power,
President Truman established the Atomic Energy Commission(AEC) in October
1945; along with it a Special Senate Subcommittee on Atomic Energy was also
set-up. The ABC was under the chairmanship of David Lilienthal who had
formerly been the Chairman of The Tennessee Valley Authority. The
Commission's purpose was to run all atomic programs, from bomb production
to medical use and research. Two bills concerned with atomic control were set
16 Dawson, 1976. p. 15.
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before Congress for consideration and debate. One of these bills initiated by a
senator on the Subcommittee was the McMahon Bill. This bill was backed by
atomic scientists and dealt with the civilian control of nuclear technology. The
other bill was the May-Johnson Bill which dealt primarily with military control
of the technology,17 In June of 1946, the McMahon Bill was passed by the Senate
and the following month;rruman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which
included the provisions from the McMahon Bill.
The mission of the ABC was described this way in the 1946 Act
itself:
it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States
that the development and utilization of atomic energy shall be directed
toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living,
strengthening free competition among private enterprises so far as
practicable, and cementing world peace.
(b) Purpose of the Act - it is the purpose of this Act to effectuate these
policies by providing, among others, for the following major programs:
(1) A program for assisting and fostering private research and
development on a truly independent basis to encourage maximum
scientific progress;
(2) A program for the free dissemination of basic scientific information
and for the maximum technical information;
(3) A program of federally conducted research to assure the Government
adequate scientific and technical accomplishments;
(4) A program for the Government control of the production, ownership
and use of fissionable materials to protect the national security and ensure
the broadest exploitation of the field;
(5) A program for the simultaneous study of the social, political and
economic effects of the utilization of atomic energy; and
(6) A program of administration which will be consistent with
international agreements made by the United States, and which will
17 Gordon Dean, Report on the Atom. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953).
p.21.
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enable Congress to be currently informed so as to take further legislative
action as may be appropriate.18
A five man Energy Commission was established by the Act. The
Commission members would be appointed by the President every five years
with the advise and consent of the Senate. Overseeing the AEC was a joint
Congressional Committee. ijAEC), composed of nine Senators and nine
Representatives. The responsibilities of the JAEC as outlined by the Act were to
study the AECs activities and any problems related to nuclear development, use
and control. Bills or resolutions dealing with the aforementioned issues which
emanated from the Senate or House of Representatives would be referred to the
JAEC. The members of the JAEC from each legislative body would then report
on the actions of the JAEC to their respective body,19 A civilian nine member
General-Advisory Committee (GAC) was also created to assist and advise the
AEC on scientific and technical issues. The term of civilian committee members
was six years.20
Prodded on by the Cold War and hopes for the peaceful atom,
government was able, with the guidance of the AEC and joint committees, to
develop commercial reactors, and simultaneously, obtain weapons-grade
plutonium as a reactor by-product.21 The regulatory role of the AEC was
18 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Public Law 585, "The
Atomic Energy Act." in United States Statutes at Large, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 60:1, 1947). p. 757. (Emphasis added.)
19 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Public Law No. 79-585,
''The Atomic Energy Act of 1946." in United States Statutes at Large,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 60:1,1947). p.755.
20 Dawson, 1976. pp.21-23.
21 Sheldon Novick. The Electric War. (SanFransisco: Sierra, 1976). p. 72.
(Point made in reference to dual purpose of AEC and to point 4 of 1946 Atomic
Energy Act.)
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negligible during these early years due to the overlapping interests of continued
production of atomic weapons along with efforts to pursue peaceful applications
of nuclear technology. This was coupled with the fact that the large private
corporations, such as General Electric and Westinghouse, held contracts with the
government dating from the war efforts. These corporations and a small
number of others, continued to function in their pre-war capacity and as a
consequence, were first in consideration by the government for participation in
the civilian nuclear program.
In 1951 the ABC established the Experimental Reactor Program.
.Through this program representatives of public utilities and manufacturers were
cleared to study previously classified technology and its commercial viability.
Between the time the AEC was established and 1951, research and development
of nuclear power was conducted by federally owned laboratories, at military
instillations, and at select universities whose programs were funded by the
federal government.22 Through the five year Experimental Reactor Program, the
ABC announced that Westinghouse and Duquesne Light Company, the utility
operator, both would build a nuclear power plant.23 The Site selected for the
plant was at Shippingport, Pennsylvania; the plant was based upon the
pressurized water reactor technology Westinghouse had developed for the
Navy's nuclear submarine program. The AEC actually owned the facility and
would receive its power output. This plant did not go into operation until
1957.24
22 Dean,1953. pp. 10 -11.
23 This plant was ~ctually authorized by the AEC under this program in
1952.
24 Bupp and Derian, 1978. p.32.
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..
As of 1952, thirteen nuclear reactors had been built for weapons
production. The reactors had been built at government owned laboratories and
the technology being used for the construction of these facilities was making a
steady transition from strict military control into the civilian realm.
Experimental energy producing reactors were also being developed at these
sites. All of the work at this time was contracted out to private firms. Although
the government did no actual hiring it provided the funds necessary for industry
to explore the field.25
Between 1951 and 1954 the ABC authorized nineteen groups of
research scientists from industry to explore the feasibility of nuclear power
initiatives in the civilian sector. Around forty utilities, equipment
manufacturers, and construction companies were involved.26 Four of these
separate industrial research teams that had been commissioned by the
government to study the dual purposes of nuclear technology in 1952. They
reported that nuclear reactors could provide economical power to utilities in the
very near future. Some of the companies who comprised these teams were;
Babcock & Wilcox, Dow Chemical and the Bechtel Corporation.
In 1953, Lewis Strauss became Chairman of the AEC. This was the
first term of President Eisenhower and it is important to note that along with
holding the position of AEC chair, Strauss simultaneously was advisor to the
president. Strauss came from a position in the Navy and served under Admiral
Rickover who was the driving force behind the Navy's aggressive nuclear
25 Anna Gyorgy & Friends. No Nukes, Everyone's Guide to Nuclear
Power. (York, PA: South End Press, 1979). p.8.
26 Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse. The Demise of Nuclear··
Energy? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). pp. 48 - 49.
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submarine program. Thus, Stauss' invested interest in the rapid development of
nuclear power came directly from his early involvement. Under Strauss'
leadership the ABC was driven more toward the rapid application of nuclear
technology for military purposes. The lABC, however was more interested in
the civilian role of nuclear power.27
President Eisenhower delivered his 'Atoms for Peace' speech to the
United Nations in December of 1953. It was this policy speech which offered
foreign nations the opportunity to take part in what was emerging as a U.S.
dominated technological area. In this presidential announcement, Eisenhower
stated that the peaceful use of atomic energy was a start toward diminishing,
lithe potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles."28 The U.S.
offered to supply scarce materials for use in nuclear energy producing facilities
abroad, as well as technological information and capitol. In essence the U.S.
then had technological superiority as well as some control over foreign
development.29 Until this time, no country had made a greater financial and
institutional commitment to military and industrial application of nuclear power
than the United States.
The government and institutions that were committed to
supporting the 'atoms for peace' program hoped that through a peaceful policy
emphasis, public attention would be directed away from the negative image of
atomic weapons. This conceptual scheme was developed by nuclear's interested
27 Desaix Myers III. The Nuclear power Debate. (New York: Praeger,
1977). p. 38.
28 Joseph A. Camilleri, The State and Nuclear Power. (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1984). p.6.
29 Camilleri, 1984. p. 295. (The 1946 Atomic Energy Act was amended in
1951 to allow the U.S. to share select technical information with NATO allies.)
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parties, (government officials and industrial elites working on atomic research
since the war) and aimed at containing the harmful perceptions of nuclear
technology, while highlighting the more positive and encouraging applications.
The media played a key role in the dissemination of the 'atoms for peace' policy
intent, by broadcasting the benefits the American public could look foreword to
if they supported this type of atomic development. Government officials and
scientific authorities;
Expressed faith in the inevitability of scientific progress and made
emotional appeals to the general public asking them to consider the
'interests of the nation.' This was crucial to the strategy of establishing
ideological and cultural legitimation. This carefully orchestrated
campaign for greater public acceptance was underpined by the
substantial institutiomil support lavished on the nuclear industry, which
was itself the bureaucratization of science.3o
In February of 1954, a five year Reactor Development program was
set-up by the Commission at the urging of the JABC. There were three rounds of
invitations asking industries to participate in nuclear power development.
Proposals were received by the ABC and reviewed for contract consideration. A
number of different reactor types which had been developed by different
industrial corporations were up for consideration. The invitation phases were
spread over the course of several years from 1954 to 1958.31 The program
encompassed five reactor construction projects.
Later in that year the President and the ABC proposed changes to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. These changes provided for the private
ownership of reactors under ABC license and private patent rights for the
30 ,Myers, 1977. p. 42.
31 Steven Del Sesto, Science, Politics and Controversy: Civilian Nuclear
Power in the United States, 1946 -1974. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1979). p.50.
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production and use of fissionable materials. These activities had previously
been under the exclusive rights of the ABC. The new Act also mandated that
JABC authorization be required for construction and property acquisition for
nuclear plants. The primary objective of the new Act was to promote the private
development of atomic energy. The 1954 Act also included a set of provisions
for public participation in the licensing and regulatory proceedings of the AEC;
In any proceeding under the Act, for grantfug, suspending, revoking, or
amending any license or construction permit...the Commission shall grant
a hearing upon request of any persoh whose interest may be affected by
the proceeding, and shall admit any such persons as party to such
proceedings)2
Although the clause was not utilized frequently by the public during this phase
of development, it later proved to be an important factor that contributed to the
demise of nuclear power in the United States.
After the passage of the new Act, the government adopted a
number of programs to encourage utilities to invest in nuclear power facilities.
Among these were the government funding of research, development and
demonstration projects. By the following year (1955), three proposals from the
first invitation were received by the ABC and all three were approved". Under
the program the AEC would waive all charges for the industry's use of
fissionable materials, undertake certain basic research in its National
Laboratories at government expense and enter into fixed-sum research and
development contracts to procure technical and economic data for the
applicants.)) The demonstration program marked the consolidation of the
32 Public Law 703, "The Atomic Energy Act." in United States Statutes at
Large 1954. (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 68:1, 1955). p.
955-56.
33 Bupp, and Derian, 1978. p.33.
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government-industry partnership in nuclear energy development.34
In 1956, the ABC commissioned a report from the Brookhaven
National Laboratory in Long Island. This report was commissioned to evaluate
the possible effects of a major nuclear reactor accident. The report released
March 1957, was entitled; "Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major
Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants" it is more commonly referred to as
WASH - 740. The WASH - 740 revealed, of the three types of nuclear accidents
studied, the worst possible outcome or the "maximum credible accident" could
result in 3,400 deaths and 43,000 injuries, property damage as much as $6 billion,
contamination of a land area the size of the state of Maryland.35 Although these
numbers appear staggering, they did not cause any hesitation on the part of
utilities or the government to continue the hasty development of the program.
Later that same year, a safety report was published by the
Engineering Research Institute of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. This
study focused on the release of radiation from a possible nuclear accident at a
plant nearby and the affects of such an accident on the population. The report
stated that in a maximum radiation release, 133,000 people would receive high
doses of radiation and 181,000 others would receive enough radiation that could
prove fatal. This report estimated a greater incidence of injury and death than
the government commissioned WASH -740.36
Until the release of these reports, the AEC adjunct committees,
industry and utilities did not appear to give much consideration to the health
34 Del Sesto, 1979. p. 55.
35 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretical Possibilities
and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, WASH -
740 (Washington D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, 1958), pp.576-579.
36 Gyorgy & Friends, 1979. p.l0.
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and safety hazards inherent in the commercialization of nuclear power. The
AEC and its adjunct committees. under the Atomic Energy Act were responsible
for the health and safety of the American people. With the adamant government
endOl:,sement nuclear power was receiving, one would be led to believe the risks
of civilian implementation were minimal. There were a small number of
scientists, industry representatives, and a few regulators, however who did not
have such an optimistic outlook.
In 1957 the president of GE and representatives of Westinghouse as
well as other interested parties, demanded that Congress adopt legislation that
would protect the nuclear industry and its participant companies from liability
in case that accident would occur. Section 170 of the Act refers to liability of a
utility and damages due to an accident. It guaranteed that the law will, "Hold
harmless the [nuclear] licensee and other persons idemnified" from the liability
claims arising from nuclear accidents causing total damages in excess of $560
million.37 The Price-Anderson Act was initially passed for a ten year period
because government officials felt that within ten years nuclear technology would
be perfected to a point where liabilities would not be troublesome to industry or
utilities.
Along with the passage of this Act, the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
was amended to give the JAEC greater control over the civilian reactor program.
It also created an Industry Liaison Branch as part of its Reactor Development
Program. The control that was bestowed on the JAEC encouraged it to pressure
the AEC for more rapid commercialization of nuclear power. During the same
37 "AEC Staff Study of the Price -Anderson Act, Part 1.", Atomic Energy
Law Iournal16:3 (1974). p.220
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year, the first commercial nuclear plant was started-up in Shippingport, PA.
In 1958 the ABC was developing eleven different types of nuclear
reactor in conjunction with private industry. Two reactor types of Light Water
Reactors were advancing much more rapidly than the others; the Pressurized
Water Reactor (PWR) developed by Westinghouse and the Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) based upon GEls developed model. A majority of reactors operating
today are based upon these two designs.38
The following year, Chairman of the AEC, John McCone
announced plans for a new atomic energy program. He proposed a Ten-Year
Reactor Development Program in a three-phase sequence. As before, the ABC
issued invitations to industry to participate in the program. The most salient
characteristic to be noted about the Ten-Year Program, was that it appeared to
indicate a nearly institutionalized pattern of relationships between government
and industry that had evolved over the years since the inception of such
programs. The primary purpose of this program which varies slightly from the
others, was to reduce the cost of nuclear power to levels competitive with fossil
fuels within ten years.39
As of 1961, the number of power plants which were operable or
under construction were growing. Of the 10 nuclear power plants that were in
operation; two were supported by private industry; five were run by the
government; two were run by the government with utility participation; and one
had been part of the Reactor Development Program which joined the efforts of
government and industry. Of the 17 plants under construction; four were in the
38 Morone and Woodhouse, 1989. p.62.
39 Philip Mullenbach. Civilian Nuclear Power (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1963). p.52.
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private sector; 4 supported solely by government; one was government
supported with utility participation; and eight were the efforts of government
and industry under the Development Program.40 A number of the plants which
were under construction at this time had been scheduled for operation prior to
1961. This was due in part to the fact that the initial cost estimations made had
increased and delayed the operation of the plants.
In the following year President Kennedy requested that the AEC
prepare a comprehensive report on the status of civilian nuclear power. The
report was submitted to the President in November of 1962, by ABC Chairman
Glenn Seaborg. This report stated that nuclear power was
on the threshold of economic competitiveness and,can (could) soon be
made competitive in areas consuming a significant fraction of the nation's
electrical energy; relatively modest assistance by the AEC will assure the
crossing of that threshold and bring about wide-spread acceptance by
the utility industry.41
Pursuant of this goal the ABC under the 1957 Development
Program's third round of invitations to industry, required industry proposals to
include; organizational information, personnel involved with the project,
construction schedules and cost figures, systems for reporting construction
progress, technical information about the proposed plant, and relative research
and development programs. Lack of utility/industry enthusiasm spurned by
cost overruns were stalling immediate implementation of the government's
rapid construction policy. For these reasons, the AEC continued financially to
subsidize research and development endeavors of utilities whose proposals had
40 Dawson, 1976. p. 134.
41 United States Atomic Energy Commission, Civilian Nuclear Power :A
Report to the President --1962 (Washington, D.C.: United States Atomic Energy
Commission, 1962). p.13.
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been accepted from the third round of invitations. Thus, the government
continued its far from modest assistance and promotion of the nuclear
program.42 The United States nuclear program was rapidly becoming one of the
most expensive technological ventures in history.
The Corporate Connection
There was essentially a closed political structure for the
development and control of nuclear power in its first phase. With government's
financial subsidies eliminating many of the normal constraints imposed upon
technological innovation, such as market pressures and legal political obstacles,
nuclear technology reached a state of development, which, under normal
circumstances, would have required many more decades to achieve.
It is important to note some of the key industrial and utility players
in the first phase of the nuclear power life-cycle as well as government ex-
penditures which allowed the U.S. nuclear power program to develop so
quickly. The industries and the utilities mentioned here are presented to show
how economic forces were used by the government to proliferate nuclear
technocracy.43 The impact of these forces will become more evident in the
ensuing chapters.
In 1947, the original efforts to produce energy from the atom were
supported through the Manhattan Project. This program was initiated with
42 Del Sesto, 1979. p. 81.
43 The term technocracy refers to the government control of technology
through bureaucratic structures in which those with economic power (large
corporations) have a greater influence in determining national policy formation
than the general public. (techno{logy demo}cracy).
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Monsanto Chemical and General Electric which operated the Oakridge National
Laboratory. Breeder reactor technology was being explored at the Knolls
Atomic Power Laboratory which at this time was operated by also GE. In 1952,
Westinghouse accepted an assignment from the government to work at the
Argonne National Laboratory on the Navy's submarine reactors. Through 1951
and 1952, DuPont which had worked at the government's Hanford Laboratory
during the war was asked to design nuclear facilities for the Savannah River Site
in South Carolina.44 These companies working through the government owned
national laboratories were commissioned to explore military as well as civilian
application of the technology. Hence, minimal if any, out-of-pocket costs were
incurred by the actual industries.
In 1952, the first major full-scale reactor project in Shippingport
was authorized by the ABC. Because of its integral work with the Navy,
Westinghouse was assigned the responsibilities of development, design and
operation of the plant. Westinghouse received future economic benefits from
this first reactor project and became the leader in the government's nuclear plans
for the country. The government justified its complete funding of the
Shippingport project with the rationale that the expenditures for such a
project far exceeded the expenditures private industry was capable of making.4S
One should note the cost of this plant, since it was the first commercial plant
which went on-line. The original estimate for cost of the Shippingport plant was
$47.8 million which rose to be $70.0 million by the time it was actually
operational.
44 Dawson, 1976. pp. 37 - 42.
4S Bupp & Derian, 1978. p.32.
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As mentioned earlier, in 1952 studies were conducted by industrial
teams commissioned by the gbvernment to determine the viability of nuclear
technology for electrical generation and military uses. These teams were
comprised of the following utility/industries; Monsanto Chemical Company and
Union Electric Company; Detroit Edison Co. and Dow Chemical Co. with
Babcock & Wilcox and Nuclear Development Associates; Commonwealth Edison
Co. and Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois; and Bechtel Corp. and Pacific
Gas and Electric. The subsequent year, the ABC added five other teams to this
group with extended directives for exploration in civilian application.46
With the establishment of the Industry liaison Branch in the 1954
Atomic Energy Act, industry participation began to expand. Notable study
groups were added to the ones already commissioned by the government. Of
the six new groups which were added, ones of local interest were; Bethlehem
Steel Company, which conducted a study on the application of atomic power to
the propulsion of commercial ships; and Pennsylvania Power and Light
Company which made a detailed study of the economic and engineering
feasibility of a large scale nuclear fueled power plant.47 All of the study teams
commissioned by the government focused upon the technical feasibility of
commercial implementation of nuclear power plants as the primary focus. None
were made to study public opinion, or externalities of the technology.
It has been estimated that from 1941 to 1955, the American
government had spent more than $21,300 million in the atomic energy program.
By comparison, the contribution of private capital from 1951 through 1954 was
46 Mullenbach,1963. p.107-108.
47 Dawson, 1976. p. 52.
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approximately $8 million and these funds were spent for a majority on the
efforts of the study groupS.48
The Power Reactor Demonstration Program (1955) encompassed
three rounds of invitations to industry to participate in the program. By April of
that year, 3 proposals had been received by the government from the first round
of invitations. All three of these proposals were accepted. New England Electric
Utilities, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, had a proposal approved. This plant
was scheduled to go into operation by 1957, but did not become fully
operational until 1961. The cost of the plant was over $55 million. The second
proposal came from Consumer Public Power District of Columbus, Nebraska.
This plant cost $40 million and did not begin operation until 1963. The final
accepted proposal was issued by Detroit Edison Group, and cost approximately
$43 million beginning operation in 1964.49 It is not surprising that at least two of
these companies had been part of the government commissioned study teams.
All three of these projects received substantial financial support from the AEC.
After the publication of the Brookhaven Report in 1957, corporate
representatives became concerned with the possible financial liabilities that
would beset the industry in the case of a nuclear accident. Representatives of the
large corporations who already were m'ajor contributors to the AEC's nuclear
program urged the government to pass legislation limiting these financial risks.
General Electric and Westinghouse made it clear that they would withdraw from
major participation in nuclear development unless government came up with
some type of indemnity clause. Former AEC administrator Harold Green stated;
48 Camilleri, 1984. p. 63.
49 Del Sesto, 1979. p. 55.
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That private enterprise interest In nuclear power would dissipate almost
entirely unless some formula were found to enable private enterprise to
participate without risking public liability.so
Thus, the Price-Anderson Act was passed to guarantee continued industrial
participation in the country's nuclear program. The Act guaranteed up to $560
million in federal (taxpayer) accident coverage for nuclear accidents. Utilities
were to provide an additional $60 million through joint insurance company
pools.s1
Crossties between the AEC and industry were reinforced by the
revolving door of corporate and government personnel. In 1958 John McCone, a
former business partner of Steve Bechtel, became Chairman of the AEC. The
Bechtel Corporation then hired the AEC's former director of reactor
development to head lts nuclear efforts.
By the end of 1962, the technical feasibility of commercial nuclear
power appeared to be at hand, but economic disincentives still stood in the way
of full industry participation. Because the government had footed most of the
capital for the nuclear program and costs of plants had almost doubled from
their initial estimates, the goal of nuclear energy being cost competitive with
fossil fuels did not appear promising for utilities and industry. In order for
industry to receive financial gain, competitiveness had to be established. Added
financial incentives were provided by the government for the up scaling of the
Westinghouse BRW and GE's PRW since these were the technically proven
reactor designs and the two companies had been the largest supporters of the
so Scott Fenn. The Nuclear Power Debate (New York: Preager Pub, 1981).
p.51.
S1 "AEC Staff Study of the Price-Anderson Act.", Atomic Energy Law
IournaI16:3, (Fall 1974). p220.
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government's nuclear agenda.
Discussion and Conclusions
From the start, federal regulation strove to not only minimize
constraints upon the rapid development of the civilian nuclear industry, but also
to promote the desirability of this technology's adoption by utilities and the
public. The basic regulatory machinery, as well as the goals of the major
policies, of nuclear energy utilization were first set forth in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946. The Act spelled out the major elements of the atom's regulatory
system by creating the AEC and the JAEC's responsibilities to develop peaceful
applications of nuclear technology. There is little question that the Act set up the
legal structure for the development of the 'peaceful atom'. These responsibilities
were re-emphasized in 1954 with the revisions of the Act. By declaring the legal
structure directing nuclear technology in these Acts, the United States
Government had set up regulatory agencies and policies before, rather than after
experimental programs were in operation and experience with the volatile
technology had been accumulated.
There are numerous externalities that were not considered by the
Federal Government in these early years of forging American energy policy
based upon the atom. It is also not clear whether economic hopes for future
national benefits drove industry to support the government's political agenda or
vice-versa.
The statements made in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act lead one to
question government motivation in pushing this technology's rapid acceptance
by industry. "The utilization of atomic energy shall be directed toward
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improving the public welfare, (and) increasing the standard of living" (of the
American people). For the most part, when this statement was written, the
general public was not considered to be an important ingredient in atomic
development. This is evidenced by the fact that only elite groups of legislators,
scientists and industry representatives were privy to the technology itself as well
as the government's intentions. When the Act was revised in-1954 public
participation in the licensing process was considered for inclusion into the
statute. Even at the inclusion of public participation in the Act, the public had
no real incentives at this time to be concerned about the nation's new
energy goals. The nuclear rhetoric they were fed by the government through
media channels, led the public to believe that it was in their best interest to trust
I
the informed judgements of those in power. However;
The government was acting on two dangerously undemocratic
assumptions: that it knew what was best for the rest of us, including what
we should be allowed to know; and what is good for profits is
automatically good for the country.52
In a democracy, one would presume that the public would have been an integral
part of the policy formation process from the beginning. Later, public
participation and involvement in the development ~f the nuclear regulatory
process may have mandated that decision makers more closely evaluate their
plans. The public could have provided government decision makers with an
insight as to what public concerns about safety were, or what information about
nuclear power they were lacking.
52 Michio Kaku and Jennifer Trainer. Nuclear Power: Both Sides (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982). p.235.
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The 1946 Act also stated that the government would foster private
R&D on a truly independent basis, inferring that the financial subsidies and
government monopoly over military nuclear development would not carryover
into the civilian development. As of the end of this phase of nuclear power's
life-cycle, the economics of the nuclear program indicate that the well- intention
goals of the ABC had come nowhere near the independent functioning the
government proposed. With the continued financial incentives provided to
industry through direct funding of R&D, subsidies for the entire reactor
development programs, and the installation of the Price-Anderson indemnity
legislation, the AEC functioned to promote as well as control the implementation
rate of a technology that was economically unproven.
The monopolization of nuclear research which was conducted at
national laboratories gave the government free reign to promote the necessity for
nuclear electrical generation by commissioning research that would prove the
technology's minimal dangers and maximal feasibility for adoption. The studies
which were initially conducted, focused upon technical aspects of
commercialization. Since these studies were conducted by interested industries
and utilities, they found what the government wanted to hear...nuclear energy
was technically feasible to implement for civilian energy production.
The release of the WASH - 740 report, about 12 years after the
beginning of the civilian nuclear effort, was the first research attempt to study
health and safety considerations related to nuclear power generation. The
scientific assessments contained within the report stressed what was conceived
to be the 'worst possible accident' occurring at a nuclear power plant. Even
then, though the human and monetary costs of a possible accident appeared
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staggering, the media reported that such accidents were highly unlikely. The
media deferred to the scientific evidence of governmentally approved scientists
and industry representatives, reporting their opinions that the worst case
scenario was just that. "When such studies are summarized for the public,
persuasion techniques are often employed - highlighting selected facts, framing
the way facts are presented, or appealing to authority or emotion."S3 The
possibility of a major nuclear accident did not stint government's zealous
support of the program nor did it initiate an evaluation of nuclear power's
potential social costs.
Due to media reporting of the benefits awaiting the American
public upon their acceptance of nuclear power, (such as increased standard of
living and cheap electricity) the propaganda system designed by the government
for the promotion of the 'peaceful atom' was able to obscure more important
nuclear issues. Related to these issues which were not considered by the
government in nuclear power's early years, author Langdon Winner has made
the following comments about nuclear technology;
Human choices indeed launch particular technological developments, but
new endeavors seldom receive the degree of conscious design necessary
to satisfy the long term needs of society. Moreover, human choices may
substantially be constrained and distorted by the variety of
organizational, political, and economic forces. Before diffusing new
technologies, governments and businesses do not ask sufficiently pointed
questions about the purposes the technologies are supposed to serve, how
they should be controlled, or how they should be held to their intended
purposes.54
53 John F. Ahearne, "Telling the Public About Risks" The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (September 1990). p.39.
54 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics - out - of -
Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), p.4l.
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Cbapter2
Phase Two of the Life-Cycle 1963 -1977
Introduction
As the government and industry reflected upon their efforts to
institute nuclear power as part of the nation's energy mix, they also began to see
that commercialization needed a push. Since technical viability was witnessed
by those involved in nuclear efforts, making nuclear power economically
competitive with fossil fuels became a necessity for the government program to
work. The second phase of nuclear power's life-cycle in the United States was
instigated through the symbiotic efforts of government and industry and their
design of the nuclear propaganda system, to secure a trend of commercial
acceptance among utilities. During this time, promotional efforts sparked a
nuclear fervor among those in the energy producing business and no one
wanted to be left in the dust.
This period also witnessed the evolution of previously
unaddressed problems with nuclear power proliferation. People concerned with
nuclear externalities began to voice concerns about the circumspect practices of
the AEC and the tacit agreements that underlined the government/industry
relationship. Although the voices of some dissenters could be heard, their
numbers were few. Because the general public had bought into the 'peaceful
atom' campaign they were unprepared to tackle the ominous system the
government/industry elites had created and the media was selling due to the
fact that they were unable to recognize who was in control. The nuclear flower
was beginning to bloom, but its subjective virtue was soon to wither.
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The Great Promotion
In December 1963, the Jersey Central Power & Light Company
announced the purchase of a BWR from General Electric to be constructed at the
Oyster Creek location. This was a historic event for the nuclear power program
since the proposed Oyster Creek plant was the first to be built without direct
subsidy from the AEC. There was something else unique about this plant; the
manufacturer planned to sell the plant to the utility for a fixed sum of $66
million.55 The utility indicated that the terms of the agreement were arranged
based upon the determination that the plant would produce electricity cheaper
than a comparable fossil fuel plants. In essence, all New Jersey Central had to
do when the plant was completed, was pay the set price and put the key in the
door to power it up. Hence, the beginning of the actual commercialization of
nuclear power was termed the 'turnkey' period. In the successive year, GE
announced that a similar arrangement had been made with a utility in upper
New York state. This confirmed the price that was quoted for the New Jersey
plant and led other utilities as well as competing manufacturers to believe that
the economic competitiveness of nuclear electricity could rival that of fossil fuels.
The first turnkey offer made by GE nudged its major competitor,
Westinghouse, to take similar action toward commercialization. The
manufacturers' agreed to assume the responsibilities for management of the
complete construction project along with making the acquisition arrangements
for equipment and materials supplied by other companies. In light of the fixed
price bargains offered by manufacturers, eight utilities quickly made contracts
for the construction of plants. As with the advertisement of a new cream that
5S Bupp and Derian, 1978. pp. 42-43.
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promised to improve a consumer's image, utilities wanted to enhance their
financial profile, thus, a 'bandwagon effect' occurred in the power industry.56
Now that they were commercially accepted, nuclear power plants appeared to
promise utilities a wealthy profile ensuring generous revenue at an acceptable
level of financial outlay. Plant orders increased in the 60's; in 1963, two reactors
other than the New Jersey plant were ordered, seven were ordered in 1965, 21 in
the following year, and 27 were ordered in 1967.57
In 1962, AEC Chairman Glen Seaborg stated the following with
reference to the great promotional period of nuclear power:
The years from 1963-1967 constituted a crucial period of change for
nuclear power. Costs came down further as nuclear proponents drew up
plans for SOD-megawatt and even 100-megawatt power plants. The first
sign of real economic breakthrough came in 1964 with the selection of
nuclear power for the Oyster Creek Plant by New Jersey Power and Light
Company. More of the new larger competitive nuclear plants were
selected as other utilities climbed on the 'nuclear bandwagon'. Roughly
half of the new large size commercial power plants which were ordered
in 1966 and 1967 were nuclear.58
By February of 1964, GE began laying the plans for more turnkey offers. By the
end of the initial commercialization period in 1967, GE had received orders for
some 70 turnkey plants, while Westinghouse was awarded contracts for six
more. Also by this time, other manufacturers such as Babcock & Wilcox and
Combustion Engineers had joined the market.
56 Bupp and Derian, 1978. pp.43-45. The 'bandwagon effect' was a
phrase that was first applied by Philip Sporn, president of American Electric
Power Company. This period is analyzed extensively by Bupp & Derian.
57 E.S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety (Lexington, Mass:
Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 55,58.
58 Gyorgy and Friends, 1979. p.14.
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With the acceleration of the commercialization trend as well as the
increased size of ordered plants, the AEC began to view the importance of safety
issues as a more critical factor in the nuclear program because more of the plants
were going on-line and they realized they were laxidasical in their approach to
safety. The AEC was engaged in reactor safety research dealing with the
physical effects and consequences of serious accidents at power plants such as
loss-of-coolant accidents. These tests were being conducted at the National
Reactor Testing Station in Idaho.
In 1964, the AEC commissioned an update of the 1957, WASH-740
reactor safety report. The research for this report was based upon the same
hypothetical accidents as those in the 1957 study. Even though this effort was
pursued by the AEC, the report was not released unti11973 when it was
pressured by nuclear critics. The AEC maintained that the 1965 study was never
fully completed.59 When the report was released it was found to estimate that
the worst possible accident could kil145,000 people, injure 100,000 and do $17
billion worth of damage. Radiation could contaminate land downwind from the
accident, an area the size of Pennsylvania.60 The estimates in this report were
considerably higher than those of its predecessor. Since the newer plants which
had been ordered and were to come on-line were significantly larger than those
previously tested in the Reactor Development Program, the AEC did not have"----
adequate data based upon the performance of the newer plants. Even though
the estimates of the report were higher than the WASH-740, the numbers were
59 David Burnham, "AEC Files Show Effort to Conceal Safety Perils,"
New York Times (November 10, 1974), p. 1.
60 Mckinley Olson, Unacceptable Risk: The Nuclear Power Controversy
(New York: Bentam Books, 1976), p. 22.
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merely an extrapolation based upon outdated data. This report was hailed by
the industry and the press as the ultimate confirmation of nuclear reactor
safety.61
Related to the question of safety, the Atomic Energy Act was
amended in 1965 to extend the indemnity legislation of the Price-Anderson Act
for another 12 years. The Act was extended again in 1977 for the same period of
time. This meant that atomic energy was still being singled out from all other
technologies and provided special government indemnity and limitations on
liability. It was also evidence that the government and industry who asked that
the Act be renewed, were still unsure of the safety of the plants.62
The AEC's misgivings about the safety of nuclear reactor
technology were exhibited through the commissioning of an outside task force to
investigate whether the emergency safety systems proposed for new plants were
adequate. The task force was headed by William Ergen from the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (which also conducted weapons research) and its report
was presented to the Commission in 1967. It voiced strong uncertainty
regarding the adequacy of the emergency core-cooling systems (ECCS) of
nuclear plants. The report recommended improvements in the existing ECCS
and simulation models for estimating accident parameters.63
With the environmental movement on the rise, attention to
radiation hazards resulting from nuclear plant emissions and accidents became a
61 Harvey Wasserman, Killing Our Own (New York: Delacorte Press,
1982). p.230.
62 Harold P. Green, "Nuclear Safety and the Public Interest," Nuclear
News 15 (September 1972), pp. 75-77.
63 Elizabeth Rolph, Regulation of Nuclear Power: The Case of the Light
Water Reactor (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977), p.39.
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concern. It was not until 1969, when president Nixon signed the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), that environmental groups were able to have
some political input on radiation issues. The Act set up the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to oversee and direct national environmental policies
and monitor the activities of all agencies whose activities might affect the
environment.64
In 1969 alone, utilities spent $323.8 million on sales and media
advertising of nuclear plants and $1.4 million on research and development of
the technology.65 Due to the release of reports such as Ergen's, in the 1970's the
AEC was faced with a conflict. On the one hand, the AEC was pleased with the
commercial acceptability of nuclear power which they had worked hard to
promote but on the other hand, it also had to admit to the incompetence of its
safety program.
Commercialization and the Oil Crisis
As more and more orders for new plants poured in, the AEC's
regulatory staff was overwhelmed with reviews for these plants. To compound
this problem, the AEC had not developed siting, licensing and regulating criteria
for the evolving complexities of the new plants.66 These two problems
combined to slow the AEC's licensing and regulating procedures, mandating
that the AEC review each application on an individual basis. Despite these
64 Public Law 91-190, "The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,"
United States Statutes at Large 1969, Vol. 82. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 852-856.
65 Ralph Lapp, "The Nuclear Power Controversy - Safety.", The New
Republic (Jan. 23, 1971), p. 18.
66 Del Sesto, 1979. p. 100.
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glitches, the move toward nuclear power did not abate in the 1970's.
On July 21, 1971, James Schlesinger replaced Glenn Seaborg as the
Chairman of the ABC. Schlesinger saw the ABC's regulating problems as being
further complicated by its role as both promoter and regulator of the nuclear
industry. The new chairman made an announcement at a conference of the
Atomic Industrial Forum-American Nuclear Society. In his announcement,
Schlesinger announced that the ABC would no longer act as nuclear power's
promoter, rather as its referee.67
In order to alleviate some of the AEC's backlog of reviews,
Schlesinger recommended a reorganization in 1972. The Commission was
reorganized into three directorates: (1) Directorates of Licensing, (2) Directorate
of Regulatory Standards and (3) Directorate of Operation and Compliance. The
goal of the Directorate of Licensing was to standardize application reviews,
reduce construction permit reviews to a year, and be able to issue an operating
licenses immediately for plants that were ready for start-up.68 Although
Schlesinger felt there was a need for ABC reorganization, the impetus for the
changes made had more to do with the financial needs of industry than the
necessity for safety. The move to reorganize was based primarily upon gaining
public confidence by disassociating the AEC from industry and a promotional
image. Despite regulatory and safety problems being experienced by the AEC
and industry in the 1960's and 1970's, the drive to continue
commercialization was not quelled.
67 "AEC to Referee, Not Promote Industry.", Science Vol. 174 (October 29,
1971), p. 478.
68 Rolph, 1977. p. 65.
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Another factor related to U.S. energy production and consumption
perpetuated the continued lust for nuclear technology. The price of oil was
creeping slowly upward and the increases were being felt by oil-burning utilities
who were passing these increased costs along to their consumers. In anticipation
of continued increases, oil companies began turning to nuclear power so as not
to be squeezed out of the electricity generating market. They saw nuclear power
as an answer to securing such energy concerns. During the oil crisis, nuclear
power gained a more powerful and favorable public image, as the government
and giant energy corporations sold it to the public as a panacea for foreign
energy dependence. The press published positive information about nuclear
power through advertisements, while the electrical power industry engaged in a
massive public relations campaigns and government officials made their pro-
nuclear opinions known in light of the oil crisis.69 "Between 1970 and 1973, as
oil prices doubled, orders for nuclear capacity tripled, rising from 20,000 to a
staggering 60,000 megawatts." 70
In 1973, the members of OPEC raised the price of oil from $2.50 to
$11 a barrel. At this time, a number of OPEC nations also imposed an embargo
and cut off oil shipments to the U.S. as well as some other countries. The U.S
was hit hard by the embargo and quickly realized that they had become
dangerously dependent upon outsiders for its energy sources. Nuclear power
received notable endorsement due to these circumstances. 'Project
Independence,' a program conceived by President Nixon and later initiated by
69 Todd H. Otis, A Review of Nuclear Power in the United States (New
York :Preager Press, 1981). p. 147.
70 Peter Pringle and James Spigleman, The Nuclear Barons (New York:
Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1981); p. 332.
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President Gerald Ford was launched. This program aimed at having the U.S. get
half of its electricity from nuclear power by the year 2000 and envisaged the
construction of 200 large nuclear power plants over the next decade.71 The
nuclear industry benefitted from the oil crisis for a short time, but the long range
effects were not to be felt by the industry until the late 70's.
It is important to note changes that occurred in the governmental
organizations that regulated the nuclear industry because although they
appeared to show efforts to strengthen regulation, they were merely logistical.
The impetus for these changes will be discussed in the following sections.
In 1974 the most comprehensive study undertaken of nuclear
accident risks was performed by the AEC. The objective of the study was to
make a realistic estimate of public risks that could be involved in a large nuclear
accident. This study was also supposed to supplant the earlier WASH.;.750
report. The study was headed by Professor Norman Rasmussen of MIT, hence,
it has been referred to as the Rasmussen Report. A large majority of the staff
under Rasmussen's guidance were either AEC personnel or closely aligned with
the nuclear industry. The report found that the most likely cause of a core
meltdown was either a loss of primary coolant, followed by failure of the ECCS
or other backup cooling systems and radiation releases would be of minimal
harm to people in the surrounding area.72
This study indicated that the most likely core meltdown accident
could occur once every 17,000 years per plant. It also concluded the following:
71 Peter Stoler, Decline and Fail (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company,
1985) p. 87. See also Joseph A. Camilleri, 1984. p.175.
72 United States, Atomic Energy Commission, Reactor Safety Study, An
assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, Rpt No.
WASH-1400 (Washington D.C.: Atomic Energy Commission, 1974).
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the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants is
very small....The consequences of potential reactor accidents are no larger,
and in many cases are much smaller than those of non-nuclear
accident....Non-nuclear events (a majority of which are natural
occurrences such as lightning and earthquakes) are about 10,000 times
more likely to produce large accidents than nuclear plants....The only way
that potentially large amounts of radioactivity can be released is by
melting the fuel in the reactor core.73
The report, among its other strange analogies, also parallels being killed by a
meteor to the likelihood of death from a nuclear accident. And that an
individual would have a 1 in 3,000,000,000 chance per year to sustain injuries
caused by a nuclear accident. This report was widely used by government and
industry as an assurance of the safety of nuclear reactors and was also carried
widely by the press. It was looked at as the final word on reactor safety and was
used by nuclear proponents in ABC hearings.
Amidst the turmoil of the oil crisis, efforts to delineate the
appropriate functions of nuclear regulation continued. The AEC structure was
again changed in 1975 when the Energy Reorganization Act went into effect on
January 1. This Act attempted to divide the promotion and regulatory functions
of the agency into the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA), which was responsible for the promotional of reactor development,
military uses, and non-nuclear energy R&D; and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) which oversaw the licensing and regulatory functions. The
NRC was similar to the AEC, in that its commissioners were appointed by the
President. Subsumed under the AEC were the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board CASLB) and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB). The
NRC also conducted some evaluation of nuclear reactor safety.74
73 United States, Atomic Energy Commission, 1974. pp. 1, 2, 10.
74 Gyorgy and Friends, 1979. p. 23.
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Harold Green describes the AEC during this time despite these
changes as
by far the largest entrepreneur in the industry, the largest consumer of the
industry's materials and services; it plays(ed) an active role in promoting
the industry and encouraging and subsidizing private interests to enter
the industry at the same time it is the potential competitor of these
interests; and, finally, it licenses and regulates the private firms which it
has encouraged and subsidized.75
The private as well as governmental interests in nuclear power at this time had a
considerable controlling power over how the media reported and advertised
nuclear power. The aspects of the propaganda model which points to the
political!economic interests influencing reportage of nuclear issues is confirmed
by the GE and Westinghouse domination of the nuclear market, their corporate
ownership of mainstream media outlets, and the crossover of industry personnel
to government positions and vice-versa. These influences predict, how the
media act in channeling political information, reinforcing the government and
industry pro-nUclear agenda.
The media make major contributions to schema formation and
development by providing the public with partially processed
information in various domains of knowledge and by signaling the
relative importance of stories. This information is particularly pervasive
where people have few chances to acquire information through personal
sources and the opinions of authorities are the only ones made available.76
Not only was the nuclear information framed by the media's reliance upon
official government and scientific sources, but the media are also influenced by
market mechanisms of advertising as a means of gaining revenues.
75 Fenn,1981. p.53.
76 Doris Graber, Processing the News (New York: Longman, 1988). p.
203.
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Some authors who have analyzed the media exposure of utilities'
efforts to promote nuclear power appeared surprised to find that a rosy picture
had been painted with reference to safety. It is possible that if they had paid
closer attention to nuclear power reports over the years, they might not have
been so surprised. In 1977, for example, Virginia Electric & Power Co. ran full
page ads in Washington papers stating:
The only thing frightening about nuclear power is the thought of facing
the 1980's without it ... One fact that stands out about nuclear generation
is that it's safe. If we're going to have the electricity we'll need in the
1980's we'll need nuclear power as part of a balanced generating
system.77
The article continues with a quote from VEPCO's advertising manager who
when questioned about the ad's one-sided account stated 'The advertisements
are not promoting anything. They are simple statements of fact on the energy
situation and how it affects our customers."78 Ads similar to this one were not
uncommon during the commercialization period. It fact, if one juxtaposes
promotional ads with editorial reports of the government safety studies, and
new plant openings, one would find a well supported pro-nuclear bias.
Great strides had been made by the government in convincing the
public and utilities that nuclear power was economically good for them.
However, people questioning the government's motivation as regulator and
promoter of the industry were being heard. Hence when the regulatory bodies
were reorganized, following the establishment of the NRC in 1974, there was a
77 Joanne Omang, "Group Assails VEPCO Ads on Nuclear Power as One-
Sided.", The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1977). p. C8.
78 Ibid.
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pause in the issuance of nuclear permits and licenses while the new commission
undertook organizational efforts.
In 1977, this organization was again changed logistically when
President Carter signed the Department of Energy Organization Act. The ERDA
was included under the DOE. The JAEC in Congress was abolished and its
duties were taken over by the Federal Power Commission, and committees from
the Department of the Interior. The DOE was established to encourage the
development of non-nuclear sources of energy, but there continued to be a pro-
nuclear bias which was reflected in the budget and staff selection. Eighty-three
percent of the ERDA's staff were former AEC employees.79
It was during the second phase of nuclear power's life cycle that it
moved form the turnkey or commercialization period to a time when an oil
crises sparked the need for increased development of alternative energy sources.
But, this phase also experienced increased problems in the public realm. Issues
which were previously invisible or unattended to by the general public not only
developed but demanded closer scrutiny of industry and government practices.
It was this scrutiny which necessitated action.
Public Involvement and Related Issues
As the events unfolded in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
opposition to nuclear power increased in numbers and strength. It was during
this time that citizen's groups and the public became sensitized to the problems
of nuclear power. In an effort to influence the decision making process of the
79 Ralph Nader and John Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy (New
York: Norton, 1977), p.69.
50
ABC with reference to licensing and construction, citizen groups began to
participate in the ABC public hearings.
On October 5, 1966 there was an accident at the Enrico Fermi fast
breeder reactor,30 miles from Detroit, Michigan. This was the site of a partial
fuel melt-down during start-up operations. An explosion of the core was
possible but luckily it did not occur. In 1970, a Commonwealth Edison plant in
Illinois, went out of control and radioactive iodine was released into the
containment vessel. It was discovered that the accident was due to problems
with the ECCS. At the end of 1974, the ABC had found 3,333 safety violations at
1,288 nuclear facilities it inspected. This included laboratories as well as atomic
weapons plants. Ninety-eight percent of those posed a threat of radiation
exposure to the general public or workers. The ABC imposed punishments for
only eight of those violations.80
Numerous other accidents had occurred at nuclear facilities over
the years, but the ABC and later the NRC did not fully disclose the causes of
these accidents nor the extent of the damages or risks to public health and safety.
Perhaps one of the most important issues related to nuclear power was that of
the hazards of radiation and the possibility of nuclear accidents. All forms of
media were utilized to emphasize the environmentally positive character of
nuclear power and the safety of the industry. This nuclear agenda had long
been set by the 'establishment'. From the beginning, the media reported health
and safety issues with a slant, placing higher priority on economic interests than
on individual welfare. The media also, consistently framed nuclear news to
minimize negative appearances, while protecting big business and government
80 Gyorgy and Friends, 1979. p. 117-18.
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agencies instead of probing key factors to uncover institutional malfeasance.81
The harms of radiation, for example, were only 'discovered' after years of
nuclear bomb tests were conducted in Denver. Even after environmental
contamination resulting from these tests was scientifically proven, the media
could cover their tracks. They reported that the government had lied to them
and also conceded that it didn't really matter because the actual harms were
minimal, citing official sources in their support.
Interested members of the public who were able to see through this
designed smokescreen were publicly pronouncing their concerns about radiation
releases from power plants. These nuclear dissenters were given an important
political outlet in 1969 when President Nixon signed the NEPA. Up until the
signing of this Act, there was little that environmentalists could do to gain
substantive political input. The Act set up the EPA and provided a mechanism
enabling environmental groups and other concerned citizens to take legal action
in contesting nuclear power licensing cases. Section 102 of the Act 82 required
the AEC to evaluate and assess the environmental impact of all agency
sponsored programs as well as disseminate environmental impact statements on
activities that may adversely impact the environment. The ABC opted for a
narrow interpretation of the Act and ensured that radioactivity emitted from
nuclear facilities was well within acceptable levels.83
A case known as the Calvert Cliffs Case challenged the AEC under
the new EPA guidelines and citizen's groups came foreword into the political
81 Lee & Solomon, 1990. p.201.
82 Public Law 91-190, 1970. pp. 852-856.
83 Harold P. Green, "Nuclear Power Licensing and Regulation," The
Annals 400 (March 1972), pp. 124-25.
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arena. Calvert Cliffs was the name for a proposed site of a nuclear power plant
in Maryland. Nuclear critics challenged the ABC's licensing of the project due to .
the EPA standards and the proximity of the plant to the Chesapeake Bay. The
Chesapeake Environmental Protection Agency (CEPA) argued that under the
NEPA, the ABC was required to evaluate the possible environmental impacts of
the proposed plant and issue a public statement. The Commission did not issue
a statement and interveners filed a petition in the United States Court of
Appeals in November 1970. The NRC issued a statement but the CEPA felt it ",
was not complete, so a second petition was filed with the court.
A decision was handed down by JudgeJames Wright on July 23,
1971. In this decision, Judge Wright declared
it was the duty of the ABC, like all federal agencies, to take environmental
values fully into account, and that attention should be given to all non-
radiological effects of the proposed plant....The Commission's crabbed
interpretation of NEPA makes a mockery of the Act.84
This decision was a milestone for citizen's groups and environmentalists.
Because not only was the ABC forced to assess its regulatory role and comply to
the new Act, but the topics of nuclear power safety and radiation were thrust
into the public eye.
The issue of the hazards of radiation exposure come on the scene in
1971, after the release of a 10 year study which focused upon occupational
radiation. Researcher Thomas Mancuso and his associates studied the
government's nuclear facilities at Hanford, Washington. This study determined
that over 6 percent of the deaths of Hanford workers were caused by radiation.
84 Thomas W. Keating, "Politics, Energy and the Environment: The Role
of Technology Assessment," American Behavioral Scientist 19 (September-
October, 1975), pp. 62-64.
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The DOE disagreed with Mancuso's conclusions, citing that the increased
cancers could have been unrelated to radiation and that his statistical methods
were unconventional. The media sided with industry and government opinions
about the studies and attacked Mancuso's reputation condemning his research
methods and contending that an evaluation of carcinogens other than radiation
were neglected and that such carcinogens played a larger role in cancer
development and worker mortality.8s Six years later, the government withdrew
its financial support of Mancuso's research.86 Not only was occupational release
of radiation (low-level) quickly becoming a topic of controversy, but radiation
that could be released from a nuclear accident (high-level), was also a growing
public concern. The most striking aspect of ABC hazard regulation was the
infusion of promotional biases into scientific discourse. Only limited efforts
were made to monitor the health histories of persons exposed to high radiation
doses, such as nuclear industry workers.
The ABC consistently downplayed the harmful effects of radiation
throughout this period, with the public only learning sometime later that many
grossly irresponsible decisions had been made in setting protection standards.
Many of the AEC's deliberations on this subject appear to have been to
purposely concealed from public view so that the AEC's research programs
would not be held back.
Prompted by public intervention and negative scientific assessment
of the ECCS, the AEC in 1972, held a 'Public Rule-Making Hearing' to discuss
public concern over the safety of the ECCS. This hearing lasted over a year and
85 Wasserman, 1982. p.144.
86 John W.E. GoHman and Author Tamplin, Poisoned Power: The Case
Against Nuclear Power Plants (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 1971), pp. 69,98.
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numerous advocates as well as objectors' arguments were heard dealing with the
safety of nuclear technology. These hearings brought even more needed
attention to the issues of nuclear power safety.87 Of the ECCS, a,Union of
Concerned Scientist's publication had the following to say:
The public is being asked to accept the word of the nuclear industry that
the currently installed emergency core-cooling system can function
properly to prevent the most dreaded of disasters. The fact remains,
however, that there has only been limited testing of the emergency core-
cooling system-and some of the tests reveal signs of defects and indicate
that the ECCS might fail if actually called upon. Sworn testimony of
experts in the field reveals that the effectiveness of this critical reactor
safety system has not been properly demonstrated.88
As a result of the publication of reports such as the WASH-1400, in
1974 and the Public Rule-Making Hearings, scientists, environmentalists and
average citizens continued to question the AEC's regulatory procedures and
safety analyses. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) was especially
disturbed by the conclusions drawn in the WASH-1400 report The ues felt that
the AEC had used discredited safety analysis methods, which assumed that all
credible design errors and accident sequences had been identified. These
methods also assumed that people living in the viqnity of a power plant could
be quickly evacuated, and underestimated the consequences to public health and
property.89
As with earlier studies conducted by the AEC that predicted and
modeled reactor accidents and their probability of injuring the public, a 'safe
nuclear' bias could be witnessed. Although the study was headed by an outside
87 Del Sesto, 1979. p. 171.
88 "What You Should Know About the Hazards of Nuclear Power,"
Union of Concerned Scientitst (Cambridge, 1979).
89 Dawson, 1976. pp.213-214.
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investigator, the staff under his direction was clearly pro-nuclear, with its
members coming directfy from the ABC or the nuclear industry itself.
Provisions were made for public inclusion in ABC licensing
hearings in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act but were not taken advantage of until
this period, due to public concern for safety. It wasthrough the efforts of small
public groups that people first realized the incredible strength of the nuclear
power establishment and their own relative impotence. During the ABC's
hearings, there was an incredibly ritualistic treatment of the public which
. seemed to alienate them from both government and big business interests
involved with nuclear power development.
Although members of the general public, organized environmental
groups and independent scientists were making strides in their efforts to
intervene in the nuclear establishment, considerable barriers stood in their way.
The AEC had a history of precluding several categories of data - - so-called
'privileged information' - - from public access. As Keating puts it;
While a substantial amount of information is (was) made available for
public scrutiny, there are several categories of data that are routinely
denied the public. Among these categories of "privileged information ll
are things such as opinions, evaluations, analyses, deliberations,
recommendations, advice, and other ABC internal memorandums;
information supplied to the Commission in confidence, along with the
names of those giving the information, reports comparing the particular
reactors; reports on inspection visits to nuclear manufacturers and
suppliers; and propriety information.9o
Interveners also had a difficult time retaining attorneys to plead their cases at
ABC hearings. Smaller citizen groups did not have the monies available for
highly specialized lawyers and their own technical understandings could not
90 Keating, 1975. p.57.
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rival those of the nuclear giant. At the hearings, over eighty percent of all
testimony given by the ABC and industrial witnesses was couched almost
entirely in terms of highly complex scientific and technical data, as compared to
some seventeen percent for anti-nuclear groups.91
In 1974, Daniel Ford, a member of the Union of Concerned
Scientists stated the following of ABC practices:
For the most part, we sense that people in this country generally have
thrown up their hands in despair when it comes to any serious discussion
of the nuclear power controversy...Instead they have trusted the ABC to
make expert impartial decisions on nuclear safety matters in the public
interest. In fact, however, the ABC has acted much more to promote
nuclear power than they have to protect the public health and safety....The
fact that the agency entrusted with making the safety decisions cannot
itself be trusted is a factor that must weigh heavily in the country's
acceptance or nonacceptance of nuclear power. No one doubts the need
for strict controls over nuclear power, and if the agency ensuring such
strict controls is seriously compromised, then it's a major institutional
barrier to the society's use of nuclear power.92
By the late 1970's it was well known by those with an interest in the
nuclear power debate, that industry and government were failing to protect the
public and afford interveners equal ability to influence nuclear policy. The
death of plutonium worker Karen Silkwood in November 1974 also had people
very concerned. Some believed that she was killed for exposing unsafe practices
at the Kerr-McGee plant in Oklahoma. If this was true; how much was going on
in the nuclear industry that the public was never told?
91 Del Sesto, 1979. pp. 187-188.
92 David Burnham, "ABC Files Show Effort to Conceal Safety Perils," The
New York Times (November 10, 1974), p. 1.
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Economic Aspects
Some mention should be made of the fact that although the civilian
nuclear power programs had been successful on their own terms in the early
stages of program development, the ABC and the nuclear industry failed in
almost every case in terms of cost estimation and predicting time schedules for
construction of new facilities. There was also a clear lack of comparison of
nuclear technology with other ways of generating electricity, such as solar
power, geothermal power or hydroelectric power.
The turnkey period and the ensuing oil crisis helped to perpetuate
the drive to go nuclear. But, in analyzing the economics of the fixed sum
bidding process, it was found that commissioned plants which were not turnkey
offers served as a more realistic estimate of the true cost of nuclear power plants.
The turnkey plants made nuclear power appear to be substantially cheaper for
generation of electricity than fossil fuel plants, when in actuality they were not.
The government and industry nuclear club devised the fixed price offers to
entice utilities and the American public to believe cheaper was better. Of the
turnkey bids, Philip Sporn stated; "It is my judgement a concept, if generally
adopted, can lead only to the eventual decline in the technological and economic
well-being of the electric power industry in both the utility and manufacturing
segments."93 Although utilities were duped, for the time being, once the AEC
was being questioned openly about its safety record and practices, new
information came to light about nuclear's interested parties.
93 "United States Congress, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy." Nuclear Power Economics 1962 through 1967 90th Congress
2nd Session, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.45-
46.
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The Rand Corporation for instance, reported that GE and
Westinghouse lost on the order of $875 million to $1 billion on thirteen turnkey
plants constructed between 1963 and 1967. With the exclusion of one plant, this
averages out to losses of $73 to $78 million per plant.94 The existence of the GE
and Westinghouse turnkey offers to utilities was an important factor in their
decision to buy nuclear plants. The rationale used by leading manufacturers
who offered these bids, was that substantial monetary losses were acceptable
early on because greater benefits would be received when commercialization
took hold. The prominence of the manufacturers who took the ground-breaking
risks in the market would be guaranteed a majority of future plant sales.
The most aggressive nuclear promotion in the private sector came
from Westinghouse and GE, although others were also vying for leverage. The
two firms made large capitol commitments to nuclear R&D and production
facilities, engaged in aggressive political lobbying, and funded pro-nuclear
public relations campaigns. GEts annual report noted in 1972, that their
potential revenue base in a nuclear plant was some six times that of a fossil fuel
plant. This was because they could supply the reactor, the fuel, and fuel re-
loads, as well as turbine generators and auxiliary equipmenl95 The f,ormer
president of Westinghouse's Power Division, John W. Simpson, stated in 1973,
"Between now (then) and the year 2000, the potential return to Westinghouse,
just assuming it maintains its present share (38%) of the nuclear market, could be
$300 billion."96
94 "United States Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy", 1968. pp. 50-51.
95 Nader and Abbotts, 1979. p.265.
96 Business Week (February 24, 1973), p.68.
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The corporations that produce and sell energy to the nation are
from an intricate pattern of intense economic power. Control of the Unites States
energy economy increasingly lies in relatively few hands. The companies at the
core of this power have been subsidized by funds from the government to
support the party line of nuclear power proliferation. An example of this
concentrated power can be seen in the positions held by those in the nuclear
industry and government that guaranteed continued support and funding of the
nuclear technocracy. Although the names of these men may appear to be
inconsequential, the positions they held were not.
As of 1973, Paul Austin, the president of the Coca-Cola company of
Atlanta, simultaneously served as director on the board of GE as well as Morgan
Guaranteed Trust. The Trust company was a major investment bank and
principal stockholder and voter in many utilities and nuclear corporations. A
colleague of Austin'S, also on the Morgan trust board was George P. Schultz who
was the former Treasury and Labor Secretary under the Nixon administration
and later served as Secretary of State. Along with Schultz, former Secretary of
Education, Health and Welfare, Casper Weinberger joined Bechtel as special
council to the firm. Bechtel also retained the services of a former general
manager for the AEC after he left government. While on the Morgan Trust
Board, Schultz was president of the Bechtel Corporation, one of the largest
nuclear engineering and construction companies. He held this position for eight
years. Simultaneous members of the Hanover Trust Board, also an investment
firm owning utility stock, were Howard Henley director at GE and George P.
Zipf, president of Babcock & Wilcox, the country's fourth largest reactor
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vendor.97
To further substantiate the crossovers of personnel from industry
to government and vice versa, in 1976 a report published by anti-nuclear group,
Common Cause, analyzed the employment records of to government nuclear
officials. The study reported that 72 percent of the NRC's top 429 employees had
been employed by private energy companies and that 90 percent of these
employees came from companies with which the NRC had current contracts and
licenses. In the introduction to the study Common Cause wrote that their
findings, "point to potential conflicts of interest, and the possibility of serious
agency bias, throughout the executive bureaucracy."98 In sum, the U.S. utility
sector's tilt toward nuclear power seemed the product of an ambitious core of
powerful elites in both industry and government, who saw in technology a
prospective vehicle for institutional growth.
Trend Toward Decline
The culmination of the previouSly mentioned factors of public
dissent and negative economics of nuclear power, eventually led to a steady
down turn in the number of nuclear plants ordered in the late 1970's. Issues of
safety which prompted government reorganization and restructuring of
licensing criteria slowed the pace of plant construction. Irvine Bupp concludes
97 "Disclosure of Corporate Ownership," U.S. Senate, Committee on
Government Relations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1974) For more detailed explanation see; Gyorgy & Friends, 1979. p.162.;
"Room from the Top for Ex-Cabinet Men," Business Week (September 1,1975),
p. 19-20.; and Steve Cohen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Power (1945-
1990): The Rise and Fall of an Official Technology" TournaI of Economic Issues
24:3 (September, 1990), p.803.
98 Common Cause, "Serving Two Masters" (Washington, D.C., October,
1976), pp. i, ii.
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the following with reference to public intervention and nuclear economics of the
second phase in nuclear power's life-cycle:
Aside from the direct material costs of additional safeguards, the nuclear
critics have affected power plant costs in three ways. They have slowed
down the plant licensing and construction process....Delays invited
unanticipated inflationary effects because costs were actually incurred
later than anticipated. Second, costly changes had to be made in plants
that were already partially constructed. Third, environmental assessment
reports demanded by public interveners, increased the administrative and
legal complexities of the licensing process. Under new rules, the AEC
could no longer waive certain procedures for plant siting and construction
that allowed the initiation of plant building without the actual receipt of a
construction permit.99
As the public was slowly realizing, the government had carefully
constructed a climate where the only decisions that appeared rational to decision
makers were those that had already been tactily decided on economic grounds
and bias scientific evidence. Although these forces did not change the
government's pro-nuclear line, they did contribute to a slowing of industry
implementation and government regulatory processes.
The costs to corporations and the government were increasing as
those in the nuclear industry realized the distorted results of the turnkey bids
ha4 not made nuclear power 'cheaper' than that generated from fossel fuels. The
promise of an energy source too cheap to meter was an economic illusion, as
utilities also found it increasingly more difficult to receive financial backing
from loan and trust istitutions. The nurtured nuclear flower was losing its
color by the end of this phase in its life-cycle and the nuclear landscape was
changed remarkably.
99 Paraphrased from Bupp and Derian, 1978. pp.157-160.
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Chapter 3
Phase Three of the Life-Cycle 1978 & TMI
Before the Accident
The trend toward decline of the nuclear power industry was
already developing in the mid-1970's, prior to the accident at Three Mile Island
(TMI). As stated previously, issues of safety and the regulatory process were of
paramount concern. In 1978, the NRC received accounts on 2,835 "reportable
occurrences"100 Every nuclear plant in operation that year had at least one
unscheduled shutdown. Although these 'occurrences' were reported and known
by the NRC and several significant accidents at power plants were on record, the
regulatory agencies of the Federal Government (AEC and at this time NRC) had
not refused one nuclear plant a license that had been applied for properly. In
the late 70's the trend toward anti-nuclearism was gradually accelerated, and in
1978, there was a sharp upturn in opposition. Influenced by declining
economics and new plant requirements, the pace of plant cancellations
continued unabated throughout the second half of the decade. The delineation
of this phase of nuclear power's life-cycle is central to the fact that no new plants
were ordered in the United States after 1978.101
With reference to the growing opposition among organized
citizen's groups; in April 1978, 6,000 people protested against the plutonium
100 Joanne Omang, "Nuclear Power Plants Around the U.S. Record 2,300
Glitches in '79," The Washington Post (July 14, 1980). p. A20. "Abnormal
occurrences" are referred to as incidents or events that involve a variance from the
regulations, such as; malfunctions of safety-related equipment, personnel overexposure,
and radioactive releases above prescribed limits.
101 Morone, et aI., 1989. p. 87.
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factory near Rocky Flats, Denver, while in South Carolina at the Barnswell
reprocessing plant, 2000 people marched in protest resulting in approximately
280 arrests.102 Much of the opposition was due to the heated debate in the
scientific community over the safety of nuclear plants and the hazards of
radiation.
Prior to the accident at TMI the nuclear regulatory agencies of the
Federal Government maintained that standards that had been set for radiation
emissions from nuclear plants were safe. However, these acceptable levels of
emission had been indiscriminately raised and lowered by the government over
the decades. Nuclear scientists working for the industry advised government
officials that there was no reason to lower the radiation emission standards
because emissions resulting from power plant operation were extremely small
and didn't differ much from what already existed in the natural environment.
The bulk of governmentally funded research used to establish low-level
emission standards have derived these standards by extrapolating from the
known risks of exposure to high-level radiation and then comparing the actual
emission from plants to background radiation. 103 The information not discussed
in this research is that any radiation, background or otherwise is harmful to
people and the environment, however minimally. A National Academy of
Science report referenced in a New York Times article estimated that 2,000
additional cancer deaths between 1975 and 2000 would result from the use of
nuclear power.104 Even if this number of deaths were lowered considerable risk
102 H. Kohn, "Anti-Nuclear Spring Offensive.", Rolling Stone Magazine,
No. 268 aune 29, 1978), pp. (13,33-35.)
103 Fenn,1981. p. 117.
104 Richard D. Lyons, "2 Reports see Risk s in Nuclear Future," The New
York Times (April 30, 1979). p. AI.
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was evident. By establishing a threshold for emission standards, the
government conveyed the idea to the public that a certain level of radiation
exposure above normal levels, presents no concemable risk.
A study conducted by West German Scientists, released in 1979
stated that the estimates the NRC relied upon for its formulation of emission
standards, vastly underestimated the doses of radiation that people living near
power plants received. The study pointed out that the NRC had neglected to
consider food chain elements irradiated and ingested by people and that the
NRC figures were; "Either at the lower end of the range given in the literature or
far below the values that may be regarded as realistic."105 In understating the
health effects of low-level radiation, the much greater dangers posed by the
possibility of major accidents at nuclear plants was virtually ignored. Also
related to the safety and operation of nuclear power plants is the quality of
support provided by the material suppliers for their products. These are
especially important to consider when investigating the accident at TMI.
Plant Design
In order to view how the operating utility of the TMI plant, its
corporate material suppliers and the Federal Government contributed to the
accident, it is necessary to back track a bit, chronologically. The TMI Unit-2
reactor which experienced the accident, received its construction permit from the
AEC on November 4, 1969, its license to operate on February 8, 1978 and began
105 Dick Brukenfield, "Are Nuclear Plants Unsafe - Even Without Any
Mishap?" The Washinton Post (Nov. 11, 1979). p. B4.
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commercial operation December 30, of that same year.l06 General Public
Utilities (CPU) the nation's 14th largest publicly owned utility, owned the
Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed) which was the subsidiary who operated
and owned 76 percent of the TM! plants. This ownership was shared with two
other GPU utilities; Pennsylvania Electric Company and Jersey Central Power
and Light GCPL) who each owned 25 percent of the plants. The Unit-2 plant
consisted of a Babcock & Wilcox PWR, a Westinghouse turbine and a plant
design by Burns and Roe.
As of 1968, the TM! Unit-2 plant was intended to be constructed
under a design contract made between JCPL and Burns and Roe for their Oyster
Creek location. Due to labor problems at the Oyster Creek location, construction
of a second plant was deferred to the TM! site. For reasons stated in the
President's Commission Report, the company of Burns and Roe was retained as
the constructor of the plant even though the TMI Unit-1, which was designed
and constructed by Gilbert Associates, was a better architect engineer. The
primary reason for the retention of the original constructor was to forego
extensive construction and operation delays. Since the Unit-2 was not designed
by the same contractor as the Unit-1 reactor, minimal changes in construction
plans were done to make the units as similar as possible without considerable
delays. As of the time the decision to change the reactor site was made, the CPU
policy of "minimizing delays" was one that continued throughout the entire
project.
106 J. G. Kemeny, et al. The President's Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Islandd:he Need for Change: The Legacy of TML "Role of the
Managing Utility and its Suppliers" p. 6.
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Although Met Ed was the primary licensed operator of the Unit-2 ~
reactor, it actually played a minimal role in the design of the plant. Engineering
activities such as systems modifications were handled by Burns and Roe, B&W
and GPU engineering personnel. Of the plant design and changes which were
made, then Met Ed President commented the following in his deposition to the
President's Commission;
There were opportunities for general input available during the period of
construction, and yet I must admit that sometimes a person might observe
a proposed change, and it could be too late; maybe it wasn't identified on
the drawing. After it was installed, one might have said, you know
theoretically it makes no difference where you put that particular valve, but
from a practical operating standpoint, it would have been a lot better to
put it here instead of there ... .I remember walking through the plant
with Gary Miller and/or Jack Herbine, and various things might have
been pointed out, like the valve for example; this shouldn't be here, it
should be here, or we should have done this, or we should have done
that. I guess you learn from experience...It does take a little practical
experience.107
Uncertainties in the plant design such as these expose the inexperience of
utilities in their ability to effectively interact with material suppliers and plant
designers at one of the most crucial stages of reactor construction. The above
statement made by Met Ed President is of particular interest because one of the
causes of the TM! accident was contributed to the malfunctioning of a Babcock &
Wilcox (B&W) valve.
Another aspect of plant design which contributed to the accident
was that of the control room panels and the emergency warning signals. The
107 Creitz deposition, quoted in J. G. Kemeny, et al. The President's
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, the Need for Change: The
Legacy of TML "Role of the Managing Utility and its Suppliers", 1979 (emphasis
added) p. 31.
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control room panel designs were developed initially by Burns and Roe and then
modified in collaboration with B&W, but, CPU made the final decision on what
design would be used. Neither B &W nor Bums and Roe consulted with any
outside experts in human engineering for functional panel design of a nuclear
control room. As with the rest of the plant design and construction, Met Ed's
policy of 'minimal engineering changes' stood, even though the panel design
was not tested with human interaction specific to the Unit 2.
The government's role in the accident is directly related to its
approval of the plant's operating license.
The NRC had received reports on a total of 11 B & W valve failures prior
to the accident at TMI. In nine of these failures the valve failed in the
open position, similar to what occurred at TMI. An official NRC report
was not published until over two months after the TMI accident. lOs
There were also other reports which the NRC overlooked, dealing with operator
complaints about the panel design and the obscured placement of important
warning lights. Since B & W had built and designed other operating plants and
problems with these plants were known by the NRC, why then was the license
given to TMI 2?, and why weren't problems with plant operation revealed
through NRC inspections?
The conclusion that can be drawn from the government's neglect to
recognize such reports, points directly to the established relationship with the
large corporations of B & Wand Burns and Roe. These companies were part of
the group that participated in the commercialization phase and helped the
government sell the nuclear program to the utilities. If NRC reports of the valve
lOS Summarized from The President's Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island, the Need for Change: The Lega~ of TMI, "Role of the
Managing Utility and its Suppliers", 1979
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and other related technical problems at operational plants had been revealed
prior to the accident, it would have cost the industries large amounts of money
to fiX the faulty valves. It also may have cost the companies future orders and
slowed nuclear power's speedy adoption by utilities during the
commercialization phase.
It should be mentioned here that the results of the Kemney
Commission investigation on the role of the managing utility and its material
suppliers, released after the accident, found considerable utility/industry
negligence in the design and operation of the plant. This is a rather interesting
analysis when one considers that the government was ultimately responsible for
deciding whether the plant was fit to operate.
The Media and Nuclear Propaganda
The accident at Three Mile Island is an excellent case study that
allows one to witness how the interests of informed elites are supported by the
mainstream media, tightly controlling the information received by the public
about TM! and nuclear related issues. The development of the nuclear political
agenda is witnessed in the preceding chapters through documentation of
government financial support, legislative efforts, industrial cooperation, and
overall promotion to the general public through the media. By viewing how
these systems historically interacted and supported a propaganda system, one
can see how the media played a predictable role in its coverage of the accident.
When something happens that is ambiguous in meaning, provokes
people's interests, and raises doubts demanding resolution, the popular
urge of (the media) is to represent 'what really happened' in dramatic
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· ways.l09 But, there must be a final resolution (at least in the public mind)
in keeping with the overall rhetorical vision evoked by the drama.no
Historically, media portrayal of nuclear power appealed to the emotions of the
population in a melodramatic way by reporting the government's efforts to turn
an 'immoral' technology into a 'moral' one, ie., using atomic bomb technology to
provide power to the country. Hence, every new nuclear development reported
through the media conveyed an increasingly better view of the technology than
had been initially constructed. Selectively framed information, parti~l
information, and the gratuitous reporting of pro-nuclear statements from
interested parties by the media, obscured important information about nuclear
safety and regulation from public consideration. The accident at TMI provided
the media with another melodramatic event and an opportunity for the
government to right a wrong and vindicate itself by mandating changes in
nuclear regulation that could be promoted as 'good', thus resolving the conflict
and allowing the negative image to drift from view. By looking at the accident
in this way, and keeping in mind the economic commitment that had been made
to secure nuclear power's development, one would expect the media coverage of
the accident, to; initially question government actions, direct public attention to
government/industry malfeasance, promote beneficial changes made by the
government to secure greater plant safety, and allow critical discussion about the
accident to drift from public view. When one looks at the problems resulting
from the accident at TMI and asks; How did this happen? How did we get
here? Who's to blame? and then asserts Find out! Do something! Stop this
109 Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, Mediated Political Realities (New
York: Longman, 1983). p.14
110 Ibid., p. 15.
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machine I want to get off!, the springs are wound too tight, for the public alone
to bring the system to a screeching halt.
The promotional practices of TMI's operating utility and media
coverage prior to the accident are important to consider in order to view the
overwhelming nature of the propaganda system related to a specific plant's
operations. Met Ed began issuing press releases on the status of TMI on a
weekly basis in 1974. These releases were written by engineers and relied upon
technical and scientific jargon to communicate with the media as well as the
public. Due to the fact that most mainstream, media science writers and the
general public were and continue to be unfamiliar with that type of highly
technical information, the releases took a backseat to more current,
understandable feature stories.
As with the public licensing hearings held by the AEC/NRC to
appease concerned citizens, the information released to the media by Met Ed,
made no effort to invite interest, understanding or substantial input from the
general public. Even though Friedman (1981) and other authors state that part of
the communication problem of the Met Ed releases can be attributed to the
utility engineers assigned to writing them, larger forces had an impact on the
tabling of the information.
The government had worked diligently throughout the years of
nuclear power's development in conditioning the public to accept its word on
issues of safety and regulation. The public was provided with information that
was watered-down, and they were not expected to actively contest what they
were fed through the media. When sections of the public became concerned
about nuclear aspects they didn't understand or didn't have enough information
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to process, policy makers relied heavily upon technical and scientific 'facts'
which dissenters were unprepared to rival. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the news releases sent to the media and made available by Met Ed for public
perusal relied upon a similar approach. The news releases prior to the accident
expectedly shied away from divulging any meaningful application of how
events at the plant could influence the plant's functioning and the public.11i
Another important impacting force that contributed to the media's non-treatment
of the Met Ed releases was the media itself. The media, like any marketer are
driven by economics, they runs stories of interest...features that sell.
The media, after all, are corporations integrated into some of the major
corporations in the country. The people who own and manage them have
a market: other businesses that advertise through the media. The media
are selling their advertisers a product, namely readers and audiences.
From an institutional point of view that's what the corporate media are:
enterprises out to make money. Their behavior is rational. They reflect
the interests of their owners. ll2
Drab, highly technical and scientific news pieces not only don't sell, but are
beyond the scope of the average media consumer. Friedman also states that
cumulatively, on inspection of the press releases, a pattern of sloppy operational
procedures and consistent equipment problems at the plant were uncovered.
"Perhaps the releases could have alerted the media and the public to problems at
TMI if they had been better written and more understandable."ll3 I contend that
the releases were a formality meant to be overlooked and "lull people into a
111 Sharon M. Friedman, "Blueprint for Breakdown: Three Mile Island
and the Media Before the Accident." TournaI of Communications Vol. 3 (Spring
1981), p. 119.
112 David Barsamian, Stenographers to Power (Monroe, ME: Common
Courage Press, 1992). p. 1.
113 Friedman, pp.119-20.
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complacent state about the safety of nuclear power." The nuclear program had
been functioning for decades with negative reports about plant operations being
overlook~dby the mainstream media while its benefits were trumpeted.
Until the accident at TMI, the media coverage of nuclear power
infrequently focused on 'unusual occurrences' at plants, or on the actions of
'those crazy nuclear protesters.' The fact that the news releases were too
technical to attract serious media and public interest prior to the accident is not
an argument for media excuse nor is it an argument that can substantiate sole
utility blame.
Met Ed, like many other utilities with nuclear interests, promoted
and sold nuclear power to the public after the start-up of Unit-1 and before Unit-
2 went commercial,. In this aspect, the promotional bias of nuclear utilities was
endemic to their breeder institutions. Of this promotional bias in the industry,
Harold Green of George Washington Law School stated the following in a
hearing before the Senate in 1974:
There has been a tacit conspiracy on the part of the atomic energy
establishment-industry and government for the last 20 years to hide from
the public view the risks inherent in nuclear power. I do not use the
phrase 'conspiracy' in an individious sense. The fact of the matter is that
the establishment fears that the public discussion of the risks will unduly
alarm the public and slow the introduction of nuclear power which the
establishment honestly believes is acceptably safe and in the public
interest. 114
Not only did the government/industry elites believe nuclear power to be
acceptably safe, so did the utilities, but the public needed continual
reinforcement of this point. Met Ed developed 'informational' campaigns
114 Quoted in Fenn, 1981. p. 95.
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directed at the local public to reinforce the promise of their nuclear endeavor.
The utility had placed ads in the local newspapers and on radio stations,
designed colorful pamphlets and handouts and went as far as to include inserts
along with customer bills.
If the inquiring media, at all doubted the validity of the utility's
comprehensible safety claims, and did virtually nothing to tip-off the public,
why would it investigate jargonized press releases from the utility? What
economic incentive was there for the Washington Post, Harrisburg Patriot,
Lancaster Intelligencer, New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and radio stations to
refuse the advertising dollars from the utilities? None. After decades of
government/ industry money and practice devoted to securing nuclear power's
commercial acceptance through turnkey offers and assured safety studies,
utilities not only bought the technology but also the promotional practices that
carne with it. Who was to begin asking the 'wrong' questions...the media
supported the government agenda, the public believed the media, the
government and the utilities, corporations like GE and Westinghouse continued
to invest money, and the utilities in tum became part of the nuclear family. The
government had to have realized that at some point along the nuclear path, they
were bound to experience a glitch.
What Happened?
The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Middletown,
Pennsylvania on March 28,1979, proves to be a unique illustration of how the
historical, incestuous relationship between the U.S. nuclear industry and the
Federal Government actually conspired to cultivate an atmosphere in which
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such an accident would necessarily occur. The accident location itself was not
dictated by the conspiring forces, for such a thing could have occurred in
AnytoWll, USA. However, the government's overt efforts to promote nuclear
power technology, its lenience in regulation which enabled the technology's
celeritous adoption by industry, and its backward approach to safety which
disregarded the democratic process did culminate in Pennsylvania where
nuclear power received its first endorsement for commercial acceptance.
Although the discussion of nuclear power technology up until this
point has neglected to discuss how a nuclear reaction occurs as well as the
mechanical and structural components of nuclear reactors, it is now imperative
to present this information, as it relates directly to the TMI accident. What
follows is only a brief description and is by no means complete. A nuclear
reactor is designed to allow a fission chain reaction to occur at a controlled rate.
This enables the heat being released to convert water to steam which then drives
turbines for electricity generation. This means that~bycontrollingsome of the
aspects of fission reactions in the core of the reactor, each individual fission
event instigates exactly one more. us
The nuclear technology used to generate electricity in TMI's Unit-2
reactor, (where the accident took place) used the Pressurized Water Reactor
(PWR) design type. This type of reactor employs lightly enriched uranium and
primary and secondary water systems used to control the heat of the reaction.
The primary coolant water is under sufficiently high pressure so that it doesn't
boil. The secondary water circuit extracts the heat from the coolant which is
us Christopher Lampton, Predicting Nuclear and Other Disasters, (New
York: Franklin Watts, 1989). pp. 70-71.
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circulated through a turbine, and is used to generate electridty,l16 Problems
with the PWR Reactor type have been related to the safe and proper functioning
of the pressure vessel controlling the coolant waters. Control rods which are
made of neutron absorbing materials, are raised or lowered into the reactor core
from above to either slow down the chain reactions or speed them up. It should
also be mentioned that the TMI plant has a concrete containment structure,
encapsulating the area where the reactions occur.
At approximately 4:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979, the pump that
circulated water in the secondary system stopped working, which halted the
flow of water within this system. Because this water stopped flowing in this
system, the temperature of the water in the primary system began to rise along
with the pressure of the water. After the pressure reached a certain point, a
relief valve opened to release some of the water from the system. The control
rods were then lowered to slow the reaction in the core. The fission reaction was
halted by the lowering of the rods but heat was still being generated by the
radioactive elements still within the core. To cool the core, three emergency
cooling pumps were turned on, but only water from one of the pumps reached
the destination. Two of the valves where the water from the other two pumps
was to pass, had been closed a few days prior for maintenance. In the control
room, the pressurizer gauge for the pumps was rising off the scale, incorrectly
indicating to control room technicians that there was core coolant present and
that it was extremely pressurized. At this point, the initial valve which opened
to release the pressure from the primary system had not closed and was
releasing the water from the system. The water drained into a nearby tank and
116 John May, Nuclear Age, (New York: Greenpeace, 1989). pp. 42-43.
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proceeded to overflow onto the floor of the pump-house building·u7
The workers knew there was a problem; lights on the control
panels flashed, and sirens sounded. In the confusion of the lights and noise, the
control room operators were hindered in finding the source of the actual
malfunctions. One of the operators turned off the single pump that was feeding
water into the system because a gauge read that there was ample water being
supplied to cool the system down. The core of the reactor became uncovered
from the lack and loss of the water. Two-and-a half hours after the accident
began, the relief valve was closed, and it took another hour to bring water back
into the system. The effort to shut down the plant to a point where no heat was
being generated from the core, took several days. Radiation was released into
the atmosphere and from the water that overflowed into the containment
building, which was not built to hold radioactive materia1. 118 Around 7:30 in the
morning, sudden increases in pressure pointed to blockage of the cooling
system, perhaps to a hydrogen bubble that has formed in the reactor vessel.l19
Later that morning, radioactive steam began escaping from the auxiliary
building. This continued until early afternoon.
Radioactivity continued to leak from the plant into the second day
of the crisis, and low levels of radiation were detected in the atmosphere as far
as 20 miles away. The NRC and other experts were unable to pin point the cause
of the accident at this point. On the third day of the crisis, a new burst of
radiation was released into the air deliberately. Gases that had built up in the
117 May, 1989. p.215-16.
118 Lampton, 1989. p. 110.
119 Bill Kiesling and Ed Perrone, "Corporate Meltdown," The Progressive
Gune 12, 1979). p.14.
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reactor's cooling water system were becoming dangerously pressurized and the
release was controlled and necessary to prevent further plant complications,12O
During the venting of the steam, a hydrogen bubble was discovered by officials
in the reactor core. Due to this release of radioactivity and the worry over
explosion of the bubble, Governor Thornburgh recommended that pregnant
women and pre-school aged children in a five-mile radius surrounding the
plant, evacuate. At this point the NRC sent in Harold Denton to assume
centralized control of all information concerning the accident and its
developments. The decision to centralize the source of information was due to
conflicting statements made by plant officials, PA politicians, and NRC
representatives to the media. Seyen days after the crisis had begun, on April
third, the reactor was finally stabilized, the hydrogen bubble which posed no
real danger, subsided, and the crisis receded. 121
The Media and the Accident
The first press release written by Jack Herbine, Vice President for
Generation at Met Ed stated that
The nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island, Unit-2 was shut down as
prescribed when a malfunction related to the feedwater pump occurred
about 4:00 A.M. Wednesday. The entire unit was systematically shut
120 Thomas B. Farrell, et al., "Accidental Rhetoric: the root Metaphores of
Three Mile Island," Communication Monographs Vol. 48 (December 1981) p.
282.
121. Stephen Orlofsky, ed., Facts on File (New York: Facts on File Inc.,
(April 6, 1979). pp. 242-43.
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down and will be out of service for about a week while equipment is
checked and repairs are made.In
An optimistic air was definitely present in the initial reports about the accident
from officials at the site. In the President's Commission report, a study assessing
reassuring versus alarming statements made to the press by numerous sources is
included. It found that in the first week of the accident, President Jimmy Carter
and Energy Secretary, James Schlesinger were quoted more than 36 times, and
all of these quoted statements were assuring about the accident. Although this
study was geared to prove that the press acted inadequately in informing the
public, it still makes its point about the sources of the assuring statements. In a
sample from the Washington Post the day after the accident, official sources
were referenced over 28 times in one article and its over-all tone was most
reassuring. Charles Gallina, an NRC investigator stated that; "Nothing critical
failed (at the plant), but its a dirty problem."l23, and Charles Blaisdell of PAIs
Emergency Management Agency said; "Our word is that the people have
nothing to worry about. The radiation level is what people would get if they
played golf in the sunshine."124 Amongst numerous articles in the Harrisburg
Patriot, that same day, Schlesinger is quoted as stating the following:
The nuclear power plant industry has a good safety record. Over the
years there have been no fatalities resulting from the use of nuclear
power. Nothing is riskless, but when one weighs the risks overall, the
advantages of nuclear power exceed the risks...Nuclear power continues
to be an essential element in the nation's energy mix. Failure to do that
122 David Rubin and Ann Cunningham, "Report of the Public's Right to
Information Task Force," The President's Commission on the Accident at Three
mile Island (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980). p. 117.
123 Thomas O'Toole, "Radiation Spreads 10 Miles From A-Plant Mishap
Site," The Washington Post (March 29, 1979). p. AI.
124 Ibid., p. A7.
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will mean growing dependence on foreign sources of supply and
ultimately shortages that will affect the American economy.l25
As in the past, Schlesinger's 'official' statements were parroted by the media,
unaccompanied by contradiction. His reliance upon the traditional themes of
nuclear power's safety, necessity and economic importance were by no means
edited but rather framed by the Ifact' that no one was hurt as a result of the
accident.
The reports which ensued in daily papers detailed practically
every occurrence at the plant over the following week. Due to the confusion of
the crisis situation and the necessity for conveying immediate information to the
public, reporters relied almost exclusively upon official statements from
government officials, plant operators and utility spokesmen. Many times these
statements conflicted, causing public confusion over what was actually
happening and what it meant for them. Consistence in this confusion is
witnessed by the fact that a majority of independently owned daily newspapers,
are dependent upon the AP and UPI wire services for their information and
generally follow the nation's newspapers of record such as the Washington Post
and the New York Times. Thus, to view how the mainstream media reported
the accident it is more appropriate to look at media sources which had more than
a day to gather their information.
In the April 7th issue of TIME, an article about TMI was the feature
story. The article's banner heading was "A Nuclear Nightmare" and a
photograph of the cooling towers graced the issue's cover. The copy opens with
a dramatic description; In the dead of the night, hulks the 372-ft cooling towers
125 "He Favors N-Power Despite Accident," The Patriot (Match 29,1979).
p.5.
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and two high domed nuclear reactors..."I26 A brief synopsis of the events which
occurred in Harrisburg is given, stating that Pennsylvania Governor, Richard
Thornburgh advised the evacuation of preschool-aged children and pregnant
women, within a five mile radius of the plant leave the area. It summarizes how
'officials' at the site, by the week's end insisted that danger was receding. The
next quote reported in the article is by "Declared nuclear critic, Ralph Nader:
This is the beginning of the end for nuclear power in this country."127 TIME
commentary to Nader's assertion, "This of course was a considerable rush to
judgement." Then the public is told that the accident at TMI will have benefits
for the country and it's citizens in the form of "even tougher safety standards."
By continuing to rely upon the progress myth (ie., out with the old in with the
new safety standards), the cultural entrepreneurs have kept in line with past
nuclear propaganda. Since TMI was not an event that the propaganda system
predicted or expected the establishment is confronted with an opportunity to
redeem themselves through greater progress. No official scandal is complete
without high-profile intent of redemption,128
On the following pages of the article is a watered-down description
of "How it Works", the nuclear reactor at TMI, that is. The discussion then turns
to the initial downplay of the accident by Herbine. Followed closely by a brief
commentary about 'The China Syndrome", a movie which dealt with a nuclear
accident and was released three weeks prior to TMI. "The thriller depicts
nuclear plant officials as placing greed for profits far above the concern for
126 "A Nuclear Nightmare," TIME (April 7, 1979). p.8.
127 Ibid.
128 Lee & Solomon, 1990. p. 205.
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public safety."129 The reference continues, stating that the key character is unfair
in its "villainous caricature of power and construction industry officials, its basic
premise will no longer seem so far-fetched to those moviegoers unattuned to the
nation's debate over nuclear power."130
In reference to the water which overflowed onto the floor of the
pumphouse building, the article cites a quote from Don Curry, Met Ed's top
public relations official.
There have been no recordings of any significant levels of radiation and
none are expected outside the plant...There is no danger of a meltdown.
There were no injuries, either to plant workers or to the public. l3l
But soon after this statement, it is reported that Pennsylvania's Department of
Environmental Resource (DER) officials flew over the plant and detected a
"small release" of radiation into the environment. The article then bounces back
and forth, citing quotes from utility officials, which were reassuring; quotes
from governmental officials (NRC, Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania and
Governor of Pennsylvania) stating that Met Ed's information was misleading
and conflicting. Thus, transferring the immediate blame and attention onto the
utility, a comfortable scapegoat was provided for the public to attack. Then, to
personalize the article a bit, a quote is added by William Metzger a maintenance
man at the plant.; "There was an accident, not a disaster. I'm not afraid. I think
the plants are safe."132
It is difficult to give the concise picture that the article displays. It
discusses the developments at the plant as the accident continued and parrots
129 "A Nuclear Nightmare," April 7, 1979. p. 11.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., p. 12.
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information given by numerous sources. After the article relays information
about the hydrogen bubble which formed in the reactor, we are told that state
and local officials are readying evacuation plans. President Carter is then
quoted as saying that an evacuation would not indicate that danger was high,
rather it would be a precautionary measure. On the following page of the article
is an inset "How Much is Too Much", which discusses radiation levels and the
dangers of radiation exposure. Along these lines, the article states that this
accident will fuel the fire for anti-nuke groups; "An amalgam of the
intellectually concerned and the idealistic young."133 The context of this phrase
promotes the stereotype of interventionists as hippies left-over from the 60's or
students who are ridiculously naive and out of touch with "the hard realities of
modern politiCS."134 The article also 'exposes' a brief history of past problems
with the TM! plants and other U.S. plants. It closes with statements from
'scientists' who say that non-nuclear power alternatives for energy production
are not feasible.
The article included in this issue of TIME contribute nine pages to
the entire magazine. Numerous photographs are interspersed with the
discussion of the accident; surrounding an official spokesperson, pictures of Met
Ed officials, the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania, a local house dwarfed by
the cooling towers, an aerial view of the plant, two diagrams of the reactor, a
map of the surrounding area, a mother clutching her young child, refugees at the
Hershey arena, an atomic waste tank, anti-nuke protesters, and a map of the
United States showing where other reactor sites exist.
133 Ibid., p.19.
134 Charolette Ryan, Prime Time Activism (Boston, MA: South End Press,
1991). p. 69.
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The article content and photographs in the same week Newsweek
issue are not much different from what was presented in the TIME article. The
Newsweek comprises 12 pages of the issue, and some of the photographs were
different, with the exclusion of the aerial view of the plant and the anti-nuclear
protesters, which were exactly the same as those used in TIME. Fourteen
photographs were included in this article and a more detailed diagram of the
plant's reactor were shown.135
It is not surprising that the TIME and Newsweek articles are
similar when one looks at the fact that both 'news' magazines are "Subsumed
under the Washington Post."136 The articles both appear to provide a balanced
account of the situation, but subtle assertions and editorial comments about the;
continued necessity for nuclear power, the danger of the accident (or non
danger) as reported by public officials, the benefit of more strict control of plants
which will result from the accident, and the depiction of anti-nuclear activists as
being outside the accepted range of opinion, certainly frame the facts for the
reader. It should be mentioned that no anti-nuclear activists were interviewed
for either piece probably because
The pre-established system and past media frames have ideological
inertia on their side, Le., they build on assumptions so taken for granted
that mainstream media perceive them as the only logical approach to a
situation. Conversely, challengers present unknown information
organized around unfamiliar political assumptions. I37
Another point which accentuates the homogenization of the articles in the two
135 Merrill Shiels and William J. Cook, "Nuclear Accident," Newsweek
(April 9, 1979). pp.24-39.
136. Herman & Chomsky, 1988. p.5.
137 Ryan,1991. p. 68.
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issues and their similar frame can be drawn, if one considers that all of the
reporters on the scene were staying at the same hotels, sharing the same stories,
eating together and reiterating conflicting, mis-information to one another.
In discussing how the major networks covered the accident at TMI,
the Gamson study (1989) provides a clear summarization:
CBS and NBC left the work to the viewer to make its own conclusions
based upon the facts that were presented about the accident. But, ABC
presented a picture of environmental extremists as the same kind of
people who were involved in antiwar (Vietnam) demonstrations. No
interviews or quotes from protesters were used by NBC. Only CBS made
any attempt to present the demonstrators' views. Three sound-bites were
used conveying the sentiments of people representing the IIClamshell
Alliancell and one of these three statements supported the accepted view
that the activists were fanatics; 'The anti nuclear movement is an antiwar
movement. We're fighting a war that has been waged against the
environment and our health.'138
The study also found that of these TMI reports, a majority of the discussions
focused upon the human interest perspective; What is it like living next to TMI?,
Is the situation under control?, and How do you feel about the accident? The
news magazines articles also feature the human factor element in their copy by
asking local residents similar questions. The utilization of personal accounts of
the accident by the mainstream media is yet another way the facts may be
distorted.
The personalized format, with its focus on the individual, can obscure
how individual cases (like TM!) are connected to a broader social
inequity. A single case could exemplify broader social injustices that
cannot be resolved without institutional changes. But, in segmenting the
interesting from the important/institutional, the single case and its
resolution become the news. 139
138 Summarized from Gamson et a1., July 1989. pp.18-21.
139 Ryan, 1991. p. 44.
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In the case of the accident at TMI, utility blame was discussed and the
inadequacy of communication channels but the broader issue of the historic
development of nuclear power, and how the accident was instigated by
institutional forces was left unaddressed.
Further support of the mass media's avoidance of important
institutional practices and its filtering of information, 'fit to be viewed' by the
public is witnessed by reviewing how the alternative media reported the
accident. It is necessary to include a discussion of alternative media reporting
because through it, radically different perspectives receive a fair hearing. In the
mainstream media
The daily life stories that embody the truths of social elites and their
publics seem objective because they are confirmed time and time again by
self-fulfilling documentary detail. Information that doesn1t fit the
symbiotic mold can be ignored, denied or rationalized out of serious
consideration... 140
Alternative media sources are not subject to the same economic environment as
that of the mainstream media. Their sources of income may be retained by a
minimal number of advertisers but they rely heavily upon the donations of
private individuals. Thus, the alternative media are not limited to print
information or views which are obliged by large government and industry
financial backers. Alternative media, however, are also constrained by their
sources of financial support because it hinders the broad dissemination of
information to mass audiences. Even if members of the public may doubt the
facts presented to them in the mainstream media, they may have limited
exposure to, or experience with alternative views and assimilating information
140 W. Lance Bennett and Murray Edelman, "Towards a New Political
Narrative," Journal of Communications (Autumn 1985). p.158.
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to construct alternative realities. "In times of crisis, the political environment
becomes richer, conversations increase in number, whether spumed by direct
experience or by media reports."141 It is during a time of 'crisis' such as TMI, that
alternative sources of information should be consulted since what is presented
by the mainstream media will be more readily relied on by the public as
necessarily true and important.
,
An article in the June 6, 1979 issue of The Progressive, develops
the thesis that the official governmental policy about discussion of atomic
technology was established in the Eisenhower administration. The article
mentions a comment from Joseph Hendre, Chairman of the NRC in a phone
conversation, in the aftermath of TMI, "Which amendment is it that guarantees
freedom of the press? ... Well ... I'm against it.II142 It also suggests that the
conflicting statements that the public received, were allowed by governmental
officials so that lithe scientific and technical complexities of the situation masked
the bureaucratic and corporate self interests."143 The following quotes about
President Carter's energy policies at the time of the accident are also important
in understanding the political economy of the energy issue and what
governmental interests are served by corporations. One should recall that
Carter's energy policies at the time of the accident were touted as being "a new
direction" on the energy policy issue.
The Administration is encouraging - increased reliance on coal in which
they (large corporations) have a big stake, and continued subsidization of
nuclear energy, in which many oil companies are also heavily involved.
141 Ryan, 1991. p. 26.
142 Dennis Hayes, "Keep Them Confused," The Progressive Gune 6,
1979). p.7.
143 Ibid.
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The Administration would have us believe that higher prices, fewer
comforts, and energy industry incentives are the answer to the energy
crisis. But this crisis, like the President's response to it, is symptomatic of
fundamental inequalities and contradictions in the political and economic
system. It reflects the public's lack of control over the corporate structure
that wastes resources through shoddy products and planned .
obsolescence.144
Another article in the following week's issue of The Progressive
states how the accident at TMI was foretold more than nine months prior in a
local paper called "Harrisburg". The author predicted the accident and stated
that "the official stance from industry and government was (and is) that 'nuclear
energy is safe, there is nothing to worry about'."145 The article also states that
hours passed before local community officials were informed about the accident.
Bill Gross, TMI PR man was quoted on the morning of the accident as saying,
"Afthis point, we're not concerned about public safety, but the economics of the
situation."146 The article also points to the actual start-up and continued
operation of the plant which initially had numerous technical problems, as
occurring for tax and rate purposes set-up by the government as incentives for
continued operation. In the initial construction and licensing of the plant,
Babcock & Wilcox were responsible for designing TMI's primary steam system.
NRC licensing inspector, J. S. Criswell knew that Wilcox gauges had acertain
chance of malfunctioning, but licensing was given to TMI because, "gauges
shouldn't be made to cover all anticipated occurrences" and NRC's upper and
middle management had made their intentions clear to side with the utility)47
On a final note, the article explains how the plant's 'good record' of sustained
144 Hayes, June 6, 1979. p. 7.
145 Kiesling and Perrone, June 12, 1979. p.14.
146 Ibid., p. 15.
147 Kiesling and Perrone, June 12, 1979. p.16.
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operation without a major accident since its upstart, made Met Ed eligible to
receive $560 million from its insurers after the accident. This insurance went
into affect only a few weeks prior to the accident
As one can see, the information presented by the alternative media
did reflect the importance of issues that were neglected by or absent from the
mainstream media accounts of the accident. This type of information, had it .
been reality available to the public, it would have directed greater focus upon
the broader institutional issue of nuclear power. Mainstream media did not
probe the issue far beyond the surface of the actual accident. These media did
not mention the NRC's passing-over of the gauge inefficiency of the plant
nor did it stringently question mishaps at other nuclear plants before the
accident at TMI. Although the mainstream press did mention the possible
ramifications of certain types of radiation, it did not mention that the 'minimal'
amount of radiation released at TMI could have long term effects for the citizens
of that area and the environment.
Long before the accident at TM! there were problems with nuclear
power, just as there continue to be problems. The accident itself demanded that
the issue become recognized as newsworthy and attended to bythe public.
Powerful elites do enjoy a certain degree of public recognition so that, as in the
case of TMI, the public outcry will demand government repentance. Resulting
from the accident and its high profile coverage by the media, the government
was presented with an opportunity to atone for their sins through the
commissioning of a study on the events causing the accident and its
consequences. By issuing an investigation into the accident, the government was
allowed a chance to salvage the nuclear program. With the knowledge that an
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investigation would ensue frOII\ the accid~nt, the media was provided with
material for a continuing 'good story', without directing too much attention to
the government's continued support of the nuclear program.
The accident at TMI gave the mainstream media a story that
embodied fast, dramatic conflict with a clear resolution; the President's
Commission Report Although this report took over eight months after the
accident to complete, the media maintained an enduring interest in nuclear
power by keeping the story alive until it could provide a government sponsored
resolution to the problem.
Every news story should, without any sacrifice of probity or
responsibility, display the attributes of fiction, or drama. It should have
structure and conflict, problem and denouement, rising action and falling
action, a beginning, a middle and an end.148
After the report was issued, and its analysis of the accident
surmised that the NRC and the utility were responsible for its causes, the
government could recommend a overhaul of its regulating, licensing and
administrative practices that would meet with public approval. The media
covered the results and the recommendations of the expert investigative panel
predictably, saying, in essence; we uncovered government neglect, the
government responded to our exposure and public appal, we've showed that the
'system' can work, the government is changing its spurious practices.
The most prominent example of how the media coverage of the
issuance of the President's Commission Report continued to defer to a pro-
nuclear agenda is related to the problems of radiation and public safety. The
148 Edward J. Epstein, News from Nowhere: Television and the News
(New York: Vintage, 1973). p.4.
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utility, the NRC and the industry with media support, strove to minimize the
public impression of how much radiation had escaped at TMI as well as how
dangerous it might be.
Those scare stories about radiation damage from the accident at Three
Mile Island look increasingly far-fetched. Federal officials have said all
along that little radiation escaped, posing virtually no threat to public
health. Their judgement has been supported by all major investigations
of the accident. But rumors of frightening physical damage to human and
animal infants persists. None of these allegations have held up under
careful scrutiny by disinterested parties.149
The task force reported and assessed the radiation releases from the accident as
minimal. An excerpt from the Commission's report states the following:
On the basis of scientific knowledge...(the radiation doses)...were so small
that there will be no detectable additional cases of cancer, developmental
abnormalities, or genetic ill-health as a consequence of the accident at TMI.
At worst just one of the 325,000 people in the area who were eventually
expected to die of cancer could be said to have a reasonable chance of
having been affected by TMI.IS0
Although this is what was stated in the final report of the Commission and what
was covered by the media when it was released, an NRC employee, Lake Barrett
stated on April 12, that the radiation monitors in the plant stacks; "Did not
provide accurate readings of absolute quantities of radioactivity released during
the accident. High radiation levels had driven monitors off scale and rendered
them useless."lS1
149 "Nuclear Fabulists," New York Times (April 18, 1980) p. A 12.
ISO J. G. Kemeny, et al. The President's Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island, the Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 34.
lSI Quoted in Wasserman, et al., 1982. p.232.
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The media, while uncovering institutional malfeasance espoused
that the scientific evidence provided in the Commission's report proved that no
one was or could be hurt by the accident. The DER of Pennsylvania also
investigated the possible affects of the radiation released from the plant and
concurred with the Commission's assertions. The DER study like part of the
Commission's study Was developed to determine if the TM! accident had any
measurable effects upon pregnancy outcome and infant health in the vicinity of
the damaged nuclear reactor. The embryo and the fetus are highly sensitive to
adverse environmental insults (I suppose this means radiation). These
'environmental insults' can cause mutations and\or congenital malformations
and effect post-natal growth, development and morbidity.152
For this study, a ten mile radius surrounding the plant was used to
sample infant mortality rates. Mortality rates were analyzed for the consecutive
years of 1977,1978, and 1979. The data gathered from these years was also
broken down into calendar quarters. Data was obtained for Harrisburg alone,
the 10 mile radius, including Harrisburg, as well as 10 mile radius excluding
Harrisburg and also a control group of randomly selected areas in Pennsylvania
other than the ones listed. The report states that
The infant mortality rate was not significantly different between the 10-
mile area with or without Harrisburg and the State of Pennsylvania for
any of the three years under consideration. The higher death rate
152 Dr. George K Tokuhata and Edward Digon M.P.H, Fetal and infant
Mortality and Congenital Hypothyroidism Around TMI* (Harrisburg:
Department of Health) Paper Presented at the International Symposium on
Health Impacts of Different Sources of Energy, (Nashville, TN:, June 22 - 26,
1980). p.l.
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indicated for Harrisburg separately is a reflection of the fact that
approximately 1/2 of the infants born within the city were nonwhite.1s3 ..
Based upon this study, Tokuhata told the media that "there is no evidence to
date that radiation from the nuclear power plant influenced a rise or fall in
mortality statistics. When the 31 infant deaths were considered in relation to the
number of live births, no statistically meaningful difference was found." IS4
Through the presentation of findings such as this, selected scientific evidence is
politicized to conform with the pre-set agenda. By continuing to claim that no
one was affected by the release of radiation, the media proved that the
government was continuing to look out for the safety of its citizens; the safety
standards set by the government did work...not even highly sensitive infants
were harmed. "TMI showed that the safety systems worked, even in the face of
a string of improbable errors. A total core meltdown was prevented, and most
of the radiation released never breached the containment building."15s
The safety issue and the real affects of radiation on the TMI
population were hotly disputed. Two researchers, Ernest Sternglass and Dr.
MacLeod, disagreed publicly about the conclusions drawn by the government's
official researchers.
Tokuhata's 'preliminary' data showed that an infant mortality rate within
the ten mile radius was 7.2 per 1000 live births in 1978; in 1979 after the
accident, the number had risen to 15.7 per 1000 - more than doubling.
The numbers for infant death rates within a five-mile radius of TMI -
though small- were even more damning. 1S6
153 Ibid.
IS4 Ibid., p. 3.
ISS Camson et al., 1989. p.21.
156 Wasserman et al., 1982. p.251.
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MacLeod was fired from his position as head of PA's Department of Health for
contesting the official Tokuhata findings and siding with Stemglass. Stemglass
presented articles in The Nation and The Progressive discussing his findings
which were completely opposite to those reported by government researchers.
He proved that considerable damage resulted from the releases of radiation at
TMI and asserted that the NRC and the PA government continued to mislead the
public about the adverse affects of radiation.
By providing an opportunity for high profile government
redemption, the accident at TMI was integrated with the historic nuclear
campaign allowing the continuation of the politization of nuclearlechnology. A
brief look at nuclear power developments after the accident may help to further
solidify this view.
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Chapter 4
A New Direction for Nuclear Power Policy?
Introduction
Nuclear opponents, who would shut down every reactor in the country,
simply are not in touch with our needs for tomorrow. But, nuclear
advocates, who would pretend that nothing was changed by our vigil at
TMI, simply are not in touch with reality,ls8
Nuclear opponents did not shut down every reactor in the country, nor could
they have, but, how much was actually changed by the vigil at TMI is open to
some dispute. TMI was sporadically the topic of news editorials and reports for
more than two years following the accident. The prevailing topics of discussion
were the issues of the real versus the imagined harms from radiation released,
and the governments new efforts to make existing plants safer. A great amount
of research was conducted by academics, furious to find out unique ways of
analyZing what happened and what the ramifications were fori the government,
local citizens, the industry, the plant, nuclear power in general, journalists.
After the excitement over TMI subsided, the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear
plant in the Soviet Union occurred in 1986. The accident sent waves of concern
throughout the world. Chernobyl also allowed nuclear power to rear its head in
the U.S. media once again. Later in 1988 and 1989 the public was able to take
action at the Shoreham and Seabrook plants. These efforts effectively halted the
operation Shoreham and severly delayed that of Seabrook and the defeat of the
nuclear barons was viewed as a success. The issue of nuclear power, however,
158 Dick T~hornburgh, Pennsylvania Governor, quoted by William W,
Scranton III Report of the Governor's Commission on TM! (Harrisburg, PA, Feb
26, 1980). p. ii.
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did not die, on the 10 year anniversary of TMI, news pieces commemorating the
event were wide spread and mounting concern over global warming instituted a
new interest in nuclear power's benefits. What follows is a brief discussion of
the media, government and nuclear news since TMI.
TMI-Related Developments
A major issue which has been neglected in many analyses of the
TMI accident has been its economic costs. Reports such as the WASH-700 and
1400 attempted to estimate the 'costs' of a severe nuclear accident, and convinced
that utilities might be unable to 'foot-the-bills', the government has continually
renewed the Price-Anderson Indemnity Legislation. Absent from most
economic costs considerations, and not broadcast by the media, were the
financial costs incurred by the residents and the community in which the
accident occurred. A report compiled by the PA Governor's Office of Policy and
Planning evaluated such costs. The report was published in 1981, containing the
following results:
Employees working in manufacturing firms, within a 20 mile radius of
the TMI plant, lost approximately $1.5 million in wages during the week
of the accident. Those persons working in non-manufacturing firms, lost
approximately $5.5 million in wages. Of the 1,340 insurance claims that
were filed at the time of this report, (26.4 percent of which were rejected)
the PA Department of Insurance paid out $1.5 million. (This does not
include claims filed after April 30, 1980) Insurance claims paid out to
local governments totaled approximately $85 thousand and the costs
incurred by the Commonwealth of PA for overtime pay and
administrative leave was estimated at around $30 thousand.159
159 Dr. Walter H. Plosila, Director, The Socia-Economic Impacts of the
Three Mile Island Accident (Harrisburg, PA: Governor's Office of Policy and
Planning, 1981). pp. ii, 129, 135, 147.
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These are only a few of the many costs addressed in the report. Even if one does
not feel that the.accident was serious in terms of the human dimension, the
economic costs and inconveniences to individuals as well as the State, should
lead one to question the economic soundness of continuing along the nuclear
path.
In 1984, new information was uncovered regarding safety tests that
had been conducted at TM! prior to the accident. Control room operators
discarded the results of more than half the safety tests they conducted the year
before the reactor's accident, and in some instances falsified them.l60 In February
of 1984, GPU Nuclear pleaded guilty to criminal charges that it had falsified tests
designed to detect water leakage from the reactor's cooling system. Of this new
evidence, a representative of the Union of Concerned Scientists stated that there
are still many questions which need to be addressed related to the accident at
TMI.161
After TMI, equipment at nuclear plants across the United States
was improved to add further safety features. Retrofitting of faulty or out dated
equipment was mandated by the NRC and added regulations dealing with
evacuation procedures and licensing were introduced.
Despite post Three Mile Island improvements, nuclear plants are still
plagued by problems, In the United States, there were almost 3,000 plant
mishaps and 764 emergency shutdown in 1985, up to 28 percent from
1984. The average nuclear plant was shut down six times in 1985, and the
industry as a whole averaged two shutdowns per day. More than a sign
of trouble, emergency shutdowns are sudden, violent procedures that
stress many parts of a nuclear plant and could impair safety. Although
160 "TMI Tests Trashed," Science News Vol. 128 (September 21, 1985). p.
186.
161 Ibid.
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most shutdowns were due to ~nor problems, at least 18 were serious
accidents that could have led to core damage.162
Although the accident at TMI had initiated changes in the functioning of plants
and had impacted public awareness,little had changed in the industry itself.
Chemobyl and the U.S. Nuclear Program
No discussion of the nuclear power issue would be complete at this
time without some discussion of the Chemobyl accident. Reporting of the Soviet
accident by the U.S. mainstream media reveals how single minded and short-
sighted the accounts tended to be. One should consider this media reporting as
a government attempt to reinstitute confidence in the U.S. nuclear program.
Although Chemobyl was an unscheduled accident like TMI, its magnitude was
far greater and its instigation completely different.163 The event gave the media
yet another 'good story' to support the reinforcing schedule of public exposure to
the nuclear power issue.
The Soviet accident succeeded TMI by seven years, and the
government counted on the public's forgetfulness. Although images still faintly
lingered in the collective conscience they were mailable enough to distort, if only
slightly. How much of the government's pro-nuclear propaganda was changed
by the accident and the revelations resulting from TMI? Media reporting of the
Chemobyl accident gives one a good sense.
162 Christopher Flavin, "Reassing Nuclear Power: The Fallout from
Chernobyl," Worldwatch Paper 75 (Worldwatch Institute, 1987). p. 42.
163 For an extensive discussion of theChernobyl plant design and the
factors which instigated the accident see; Zhores Medvedev, The Legacy of
Chernobyl (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990). pp. 4-20, 26 -33; and PBS Special
presentation "Suicide Mission to Chernobyl."
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The anti-communism element of the Herman & Chomsky (1989)
propaganda model was employed in the mainstream media discussion of
Chernobyl. As with coverage of TMI, newsmagazines like TIME and
Newsweek, devoted almost entire issues to the accident. Accounts in TIME
stress the lack of information made available by Soviet officials. To fill the 'void'
of factual information, a report from an amateur radio enthusiast is included
which states that hundreds of people were dead and wounded,164 This report
was carried widely by the media because it was thought to be from a reliable
source. Concerns of government officials are also presented in the article;
The White House fears that the mishap could further damage the U.S.
nuclear power industry and even provide ammunition to nuclear dis-
armament advocates. White House spokesman Larry Speeks tried to
deny that anything similar could happen in the U.S. atomic plants, "Ours
are quite different than Soviet system and have a number of redundant
safety systems built in." Noted another White House aide: "We don't
want the hysteria building around the Soviet accident transferring over to
the American power industry."165
Later it is stated that the Soviets' lack of candor in this situation is
part of an ingrained national trait and that if Gorbachev had given out more
information, he might have scored a brilliant diplomatic success. Butinstead,
Gorbachev decided to acquiesce to the Soviet instinct for glum silence. The
TIME article announces the outdated design of the Chemobyl plant, lack of
safety standards (such as ours) and a foretelling article that was published in an
Ukrainian newspaper, months before the accident. The report ends, stating that
"When the Soviet Union was faced with a major crisis last week, its leaders
164 John Greenwald, "Deadly Meltdown," TIME (May 12, 1986). p.40.
165 Ibid., p. 43.
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reacted in a historic defensive style."166
An accompan~ngarticle in the same issue of TIME, states that
there were lessons the U.S. nuclear industry could learn from the Soviet accident;
authorities must be able to evacuate people living near nuclear plants quickly.
Another interesting statement made, was that to believe a Chernobyl-type
accident could happen here is 'stretching the point' a bit, because U.S. plant
designs are quite different, containing built-in, fail-safe systems. Were the
systems fail-safe at TMI?
The U.S. industry operates in an open soCiety, subject to laws that give the
public considerable say over where nuclear plants are located and some
inputs as to when and even if they will go into operation. The same
cannot be said of the Soviet Union, where government makes all of the
decisions without consulting the public,167
The irony of this statement cannot be lost to the reader. This article ends with a
fairly optimistic air for the continued use of nuclear power in the U.S. and a
reprimand for nuclear critics; "Critics of nuclear power may take some
satisfaction in halting its expansion, but their success today could leave future
generations sitting in the dark."168 A rather similar tone was witnessed in the
Thornburgh quote at the beginning of this section.
The correlate of official optimism was the unwillingness of U.S.
officials to divulge information to the public in a meaningful way during TM!.
Any critical discussion of the parallel between the TMI accident and Chernobyl
was severely neglected by the mainstream media. By closely reviewing the
issues that were skirted, one can see that the Soviet handling of the event was
166 Ibid., p. 52.
167 Peter Stoler, "Bracing for the Fallout," TIME (May 12, 1986). p.59.
168 Ibid.
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not drastically different than U.S. officials' handling of TMI.
Social systems allow accidents to occur with comparable severity, each
according to its particular bureaucratic configuration...In the Soviet
Union, cost-cutting commissars, under pressure to meet energy-
production quotas probably sacrificed safety in their haste. In this
country, profit pushing managers of huge corporations have cut their own
corners to cover-up their mistakes. TMI's Met Ed and the NRC were as
reluctant to face up to the disaster under their noses in 1979 as the Soviet
authorities were.169
The mainstream media also, did not take into account the propensity toward
human error and material failure; both can occur in any technological system,
whether Soviet or U.S.
The performance of Governor Thornburgh at TMI was similar to
Gorbachev's during Chernobyl, a parallel which was neglected in U.S. coverage
of Chernobyl. Thornburgh was unwilling to listen to radiation specialists who
recommended immediate evacuation of pregnant women and pre-school aged
children from the surrounding 5 mile area, during the first crucial hours of the
accident. The evacuation recommendation was taken seriously by Thornburgh,
only after the real danger had passed. Gorbachev's handling of the accident was
similar to Thornburgh's in that, there was an absence of emergency
communication and evacuation plans and a withholding of data concerned with
radiation releases.170 This of course was a much greater problem in the Soviet
case since a core meltdown had occurred and the radiation released was
-
extremely detrimental. In both instances, after the accidents had occurred,
officials who should have been abreast of the situation did not understand what
169 E.P. Thompson, "After Chernobyl," The Nation (May 12, 1986). p.
363.
170 Harvey Wasserman, "Time to Dispel the Nuclear Cloud," The Nation
(May 24,1986). pp. 721- 723.
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was happening within the reactors.
Dichotomization and anti-communism as a means of national
policy control mechanism comes into play when viewing how differently
Chemobyl was treated from the accident at TMI. The U.S. government, until the
time of the Soviet accident, was using the Soviet's impeccable nuclear record as a
reason for us to continue development of our nuclear plants. As soon as the
accident transpired, our government fell back into a type of 'Red Scare'
mentality. ''The Soviets are secretive ... its a national trait ...they can never be
cured of deceit .. Gorbachev is still a product of the Communist regime which
[ put him into power." By attaching these connotative word to the Soviets, it
places them outside the realm of accepted u.S. standards. This type of labeling
was also witnessed in mainstream media accounts of anti-nuclearist comments
after the TMI accident Our government also kept attempting to assure the u.S.
people that a Chemobyl-type accident could never happen here because Soviet
technology is outdated, unsafe and workmanship is shoddy (because the
workers there aren't treated as well as they are in the United States). Official
U.S. assertion of the above mentioned problems which contributed to the Soviet
accident clearly lacks insight by neglecting to retrospectively consider how our
own government acted at the time of TMI.
A Breach of the 'System'?
A few years after the accident at Chemobyl, public tension was
mounting in the United States over the start-up of the Shoreham nuclear plant on
Long Island. U.S. Energy Secretary, John Herrington declared "The Shoreham
plant must open. If it doesn't, the signals will be a low point in this [nuclear]
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industry's history."l71 To the dismay of industry supporters in high places, the
Shoreham plant, however, did not open. Many authors rightly contend that it
was· the concentrated efforts of public interveners that halted the project in its
tracks.
Opponents of the plant raised serious questions about its safety, siting
and related matters, which slowed the bureaucratic wheels and helped to
stretch out the time required to complete Shoreham. This resulted in
~surmountablecost overruns for the utility. Prompted by public
opposition, local politicians and administrators moved to block the plant's
operation on the grounds that it was impossible to work and emergency
evacuation plan for the area. l72
Along with the plant's extensive costs, $5.3 billion, government officials could
not deny that the plant's location, fifty miles east of New York could have
catastrophic consequences on the population if an accident occurred. But,
'officials' like Harold Finger, president of the U.S. Council on Energy
AwarenessI73 felt that the evacuation issue was a 'phoney' one. Finger stated, in
a 1990 Public Utilities Fortnightly article that it there was ever a need to evacuate
the area, residents would be given hours, even days of advanced notice. He
feels that the public has a "totally exaggerated view."174 If this is any indication
of the prevailing political sentiment the political activism on the part of the
public, was not taken as seriously as one would be led to believe. A similar
171 "As Shoreham Goes," The Nation Vol. 246 (July 11, '88). p. 811 - 12.
172 Stoler, 1985. pp. 162-163.
173 The U.S. Council for Energy Awareness is a right-wing, pro -nuclear
think tank that does much of the nuclear promotion work for the Federal
Government.
174 Lori M. Rodgers, "Harold Finger Looks at Nuclear Power," Public
Utilities Fortnightly (November 22,1990). p.23.
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effect was witnessed at the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire where evacuation
plans were also of paramount concern.
Seabrook's opponents managed to block the billing practice known as
Construction Work in Progress (CWPO, which would have permitted The
Public Service Company of New Hampshire to charge consumers for the
nuclear plant before it began producing power. Without the CWPI, the
company was driven to the brink ofbankruptcy.l7S
At first glance, it appears that the effects of empowered interveners provided a
lesson for the nation; if people organize and fight back they can wini
Even against the formidable forces that backed Shoreham: Big
Government (the White House, the Department of Energy and the NRC
who worked with LILCO), Big Business (the nuclear industry, which
regarded Shoreham's operation as critical to its future, poured funds into
the drive to save the plant), Big Banks (particularly CWbank, which since
the 1950's has functioned as a financial overseer of LILCO, Big Science
(Scientists from Brookhaven NationalLaboratory on Long Island have
cooperated closely with the company in promoting Shoreham and Big
Media (The New York Times and Newsday have consistently demanded
that the plant go on line).176
The public did overcome these forces, as the abandonment of both Shoreham
and Seabrook suggests. However, this did not cut-off any vital link from the
highly organized structure which was mentioned. Hopes for constructing and
operating these plants were dashed, but the 'industry' did not die. l77 One might
select the abandonment of these projects as proof that the democratic process
worked to incorporate public interests and breached the nuclear propaganda
system. But, the comforting successes of the anti-nuclear movement did not
175 Harvey Wasserman, "Shut Down, But Not Out," The Progressive
(August 1988). p.21.
176 Robert Emmet Long, ed. "Energy and Conservation," The Reference
Shelf (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1989). p.75.
177 Wasserman, 1988. p.21.
104
diminish the number of nuclear plants continuing to function in t1}e U.S., nor did
it diminish the risks of other plants on-line and those waiting to be made
operable. For the nuclear establishment, the sacrifice of the two plants may have
put a crimp in the works, so to speak, but the resilience of the government!
industrial/media complex which has endured the test of time would not
surrender that easily.
New Rhetoric?
In 1989, on the 10 year anniversary of the accident at TMI, media
reports and analysis of the accident resurfaced to, once again, reinforce
scheduled public exposure to the issue of nuclear power in the United States.
Most of the mainstream accounts detailed improvements in the industry
resulting from the accident as well as higher safety standards and stricter
governmental control. These reports tended to emphasize that no major accident
had been witnessed in the U.S. since TMI. Nuclear critics, however, used the 10
year mark to reopen the critical discussion of the government's role in continued
promotion of the nuclear agenda and its glossing-over of linear studies revealing
the effects the radiation released during the accident.
It is not Widely known that General Public Utilities has already paid
between $15 and $20 million to settle 200 health claims out of some 2,500
that have been filed. We have not learned any details of these claims
because the settlements were made with the condition that each recipient
agreed not to reveal any information about their claim or the amount they
were awarded. Most people are also not aware that the radioactive
plumes spread far beyond the 10-mile evacuation radius, and that a
sudden rise in mortality rates occurred in areas exposed to these
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radioactive clouds.178
Of the Tokuhata study relied upon by the Kemney Commission for its definitive
conclusion that 'no one was hurt' by the accident, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, professor
of radiological physics, stated that the Commission did not consider the effects
of the wind-blown radiation at the height of its release.
While the Commission was preparing its report, the Vital Statistics section
of the Pennsylvania Department of Health would not release any
mortality data, on the grounds that it had not yet been adequately
reviewed. By the time the data were officially compiled, the Kemney
Commission had already submitted its final report. 179
Stemglass, Wasserman and Gould have been among the few
nuclear critics who have extensively followed-up on reports from the population
surrounding TMI and have studied infant mortality in areas of New York,
Maryland and New Jersey in the years succeeding the accident. It is the research
from those scientists that was dismissed by government officials immediately
following the accident. And since that time it is those reports which the
government has continually attempted to discredit. Wasserman (l989) asserts
that the government has been able to convince the public that radiation affects
were inconsequential at TMI because
We in the United States think of our government as a great protector, and
the sad and sorry truth of the matter, revealed in TMI, is that the
government is not our protector. (In fact) It is not looking out for our best
interests, our public health. Quite the contrary, they (government) are
looking toward the interests of the giant corporations like G.P.U., and
helping them get away with murder,180
178 Gary Null, "The Great Three Mile Island Cover-Up," Penthouse
(November 1989). p.120.
179 Sternglass Quoted in; Null. p.136.
180 Harvey Wasserman; "The Atomic Attorney General," Penthouse
(November, 1989). p. 132.
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Wasserman also contends that when governmental officials like Richard
Thornburgh (former Governor of PA and at that time Attorney General of the
U.S.) conjoin with high ranking, pro-nuclear public officials, such as George
Bush, John Sununu and Secretary of Energy, James Watkins, there is little room
for nuclear power's promotion to be stinted.
During the interim years between the TMI accident and its 10 year
anniversary, Thornburgh spoke widely about his success in handling the
accident and lauded the NRC for maintaining rigorous controls over the
industry. As the public's memories of the accident became more and more
distant, and the dissenters were placed at ease by their triumphs at Shoreham
and Seabrook, officials were conspiring to reinstitute their pro-nuclear agenda.
With the hopes that enough time had elapsed, government officials began to
speak publicly about their concerns over global warming. Author Fred Jerome
(1989), details how the media follow the nuclear sentiments of those in powerful
positions. He states that in the years of nuclear power's developmental stages,
media coverage reflected an unlimited optimism about the technology and
during the decade following TMI the press gave wide coverage to nuclear
related happenings and public protests. Noticing a new trend after the
extremely hot summer of 1988, Jerome cites these reports from the mainstream
media:
Environment Magazine: - Nuclear power needs to be reassessed to
address the needs of the environment and the dangerous situation of
global warming.
New York Times: - Many environmentalists and politicians are now
saying the greenhouse effect has made the nuclear option more tangible.
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Washington Post: - Increased reliance on nuclear energy will be essential
to any serious attempt to stabilize the climate. l8l
The media, throughout the evolving phases of nuclear power have a well
documented history of endorsing the prevailing sentiments of those in power.
This was obviously not changed by the accidents at TMI or Chemobyl. It is the
role of the media to function as the mere 'stenographers to power'. Hence, a
challenging of the official political agenda by the media, at this juncture would
be inconsistent with past media performance and would alert the public to
questio~ the, "soundness of our self-correcting institutions."182
A new trend in justifying the continued use of nuclear power was
getting it's footing. In the year following TMI's ten year commemoration,
President George Bush made the following statement to the Nuclear Power
Assembly:
Just as America gave birth to nuclear technology in the 1940's we can lead
the world into a new era of, safe, reliable, economical and environmentally
. clean nuclear power in the 1990's. This clean domestic source of power
lessens the risk of energy dependence on foreign sources. 183
These ~omments were made while tensions in the middle east were mounting,
bringing the discussion of foreign energy dependence back into public view.
This relatively familiar rhetoric can be recognized from the 1970's oil crisis. The
advancing conflicts in the Persian Gulf provided nuclear advocates with another
opportunity to highlight the nation's vulnerability of foreign oil supplies. But,
181 Fred Jerome, ''Yo-Yo Journalism and Nuclear Power," Technology
Review (April; 1, 1989). p. 73.
182 Chomsky, 1989. p.20.
183 Nathaniel Mead and Ray Lee, "Nukespeak," The Progressive
(December 1990). p. 18. (emphasis added)
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advocate's arguments were enhanced this time around by the grim warnings of
scientists pointing to excessive .fossil-fuel burning as a cause of global warming.
The new rhetorical language spewing from the mouths of officials in the 1990's is
a form of Orwellianism which couples the scientific concerns over global
warming with the tried and true 'necessity' for U.S. energy independence. This
'new' language device has been coined "nukespeak."
Nukespeak is the use of manipulative messages aimed at achieving public
acceptance of nuclear power. It involves a calculated distortion and
suppression of facts about nuclear power, and corporate control over
scientific research and public information...Spearheading the
propaganda effort is the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness (USCEA).
The USCEA sees public acceptance as the key to a nuclear comeback.
''The primary obstacle is not the industry, which has an excellent track
record., but public perception," says Scott Peters USCEA's manager of
media services. The Council has called upon politicians, utility managers,
business executives, and university scientists to "reexamine nuclear's
environmental benefits II - and IIspread the good news.1I184
The novelty of 'nukespeak' is debatable, however, the odd application of the
environmental argument lends a new twist to the familiar approach. Sorrily, the
rejuvenation of nuclear power is not something that has only been discussed in
the media, the solidification of intended implementation can be seen in the
actual industry and government support.
Congress is now considering a number of bills as part of legislation
to implement President Bush's national energy strategy. 1I0ne of the main
changes proposed would simplify the process of public hearings before granting
a license to new nuclear power stations.1I1BS For nuclear power to continue,
industry advocates have advised government officials that a;
184 Ibid., p. 19.
185 Helen Gavaghan, "Congress to Smooth Path for Nuclear Power?" New
Scientist (March 16, 1991). p. 12.
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Licensing process is necessary that would provide for plant operation in
five to six years through design certification of standardized plant
designs; early site permits that would allow siting issues to be resolved
before construction; and, combined licenses to construct and operate
standardized nuclear plants allowing for the resolutions of issues prior to
construction.186
A decision in favor of these recommendations, would once again prevent the
public from having a voice in decisions affecting public health and safety. The
nuclear industry has told governmental officials that nuclear technology has
evolved to a point where inherently safe reactors are a realty, and that the real
obstacle lies in the public and economic realms. These statements do not reflect
the facts that no safe method of containing high-level nuclear waste has been
found or that decommissioning of existing plants will be a cumbersome,
expensive process.
Economical feasibility, contend promoters, can be achieved
through the collective commitment of; the industry to down-size the scale of
plants, making them simpler and more standardized; and government, to
minimize the licensing process, support standardization and provide funds
for nuclear waste disposal.l87 The real challenge, however, is focused upon
convincing the public that the new line of reactors is inherently safe.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission documented more than
30,000 mishaps at nuclear plants in the United States between 1979 and 1987 and
commercial nuclear power plants have averaged more than one fine a week and
paid more than $18.5 million since1987, for safety violations. 188 To counter these
186 Marshall Yates, "Nuclear Energy: Failed Promise or Promising
Future," Public Utilities Fortnightly (November 22,1990) p. 13. (pp. 12-13.)
187 Howard J. Bruschi, "Standardization: The Key to Nuclear
Revitalization" Public Utilities Fortnightly (June 1, 1991). pp. 23-24.
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reports which may affect the new momentum building to regain public
acceptance
-The nuclear industry rolls out an esteemed Ph.D., invariably cited as an
"independent" source, to offer opinions consistent with the industry's
point of view, not surprisingly, independent scientists whose positions
oppose the industry's are either selectively quoted or never heard from. 189
A recent TIME article included in an issue devoted to environmental awareness
employs the standard routine:
As energy needs rocket, America must face down old demons and
decide on a role for nuclear power. Surprise its gaining new
respect...Many scientists applauded the findings of the independent
academy, which conducted a IS-month federally funded study of the
greenhouse problem. Says Ratib Karam, director of the Neely Nuclear
Research Center at Georgia Tech.: "Nuclear energy is now the only major
source of power that does not produce CO2, In terms of global society,
nuclear power plants are essential,190
Not only were the 'independent findings' federally funded, the esteemed Ph.D. ,
was director of a Nuclear Research Center and to top-off the slant of the article,
it's author was an established writer for Public Utilities Fortnightly, an
undauntingly pro-nuclear, industry publication. The TIME article asserts that
GE and Westinghouse have spent a total of $70 million on designing a new, safer
generation of advanced reactors. "The key is getting the first one built" states
DEO Secretary for Nuclear Energy, William Young..."That would let the public
know what it can expect."191
188 Joseph Herbert, "N-Plants Average One Safety Fine a Week, Papers
Show," The Morning Call (November 31, 1991). p. AI.
189 Mead and Lee, 1990. p.19.
190 John Greenwald, "Time to Choose," TIME (April 29, 1991). p. 54 (pp.
54-61.)
191 I~id., p. 61.
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Regardless of the corporations' financial commitment to develop a
new generation of plants, this rhetoric sounds strikingly like that which
prompted the turnkey phase; 'all we need to do is get the first ones built and
start-off the market.' If the public wants to know what to expect from this new
generation of plants; how the government will regulate these new plants; how
the media will perform when the new plants are built, all that must be done is to
dig out the history books and see what practices were used in the last few
decades. If this is done, there can be no realistic choice for the public to weigh
when considering the nations energy future.
It seems clear that we have given nuclear power a fair trail and that its
promise falls far short of even the most modest hopes. The earth is not
large enough to accommodate this technology; political systems cannot
manage iti and although scientists and technologists may have performed
admirably, they have not been able to solve the fundamental problems of
contamination of an imperfectly run world. The verdict is the same if we
consider economic problems, climatic changes due to carbon dioxide
increases caused by fossil fuels, and the apparent pressures on global
energy supplies. These problems can be solved without nuclear power -
and will be, if there is to be a future for industrial civilizations. Nuclear
can by syst.:;natically and deliberately abandoned as a potential source of
power,192
192 George Woodwell, quoted in; Flavin, 1987. p. 73.
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ChapterS
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the three discemable phases of the nuclear power life-
cycle in the United States, the mainstream media have played an indispensable
role in disseminating politicized information to the general public. Many
authors view the accident at TMI as a watershed event that conquered the
government's nuclear propaganda campaign, releasing the genie from its bottle.
Although the accident did help to reveal part of the government's hidden
nuclear agenda, time heals many wounds.
There was a sharp, temporary increase in opposition to nuclear power
with the flood of publicity about the TMI accident, but when the media
spotlight was turned off, public-opinion rebounded almost Immediately
pre-TMI levels. Even more striking, the same effect was replicated at the
release of the Kemney Commission report on the accident six months
later. Again there was a sharp increase in media coverage, accompanied
by a sharp drop in support of nuclear power. And again there was the
same rebound once the media spotlight was turned off. When public
opinion is viewed over a 15 year period beginning the early 1970's, TMI
looks little more than a small blip.193
Before, during, and after TMI, the mainstream media's use and
manipulation of scientific evidence and its deference to 'official' sources
continues to confound the public's ability to appraise nuclear power as a defunct
energy option. This practice has been widely developed and supported by the
Federal Government and applied extensively to almost all U.S. policy issues.
By, relying upon commentary or analysis from endorsed sources, the
193 Gamson,1989. p. 81.
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government was able to make the statement that no one was hurt by TM!.
Although the assertion was not fully true in the case of the public; it was also not
completely false in the minds of the nuclear barons. The government's efforts to
develop and promote nuclear power have always been based upon a calculated
risk. Th.is risk is one which places greater emphasis upon loss of financial
returns over human fatality and suffering. In weighing these calculated risks,
government officials could discredit the medical studies which proved the
public was harmed: because indelible harm was not inflicted on the industry.
A similar distortion of information was presented by the media in
the wake of the world's worst nuclear accident, Chernobyl. This is manifested
by nuclear industry representative's shameful efforts to capitalize on the Soviet
catastrophe, with the claim that it could never happen here. The ephemeral
gratification gained by activists' success at Shoreham and Seabrook, however,
should not be viewed as completely without merit. What happened at both of
these plants resulted, in part, from public concern, activism, and the directed
organizational efforts of those opposed to nuclear power's continued
proliferation. The paramount concerns of these groups were central to the
health/safety issues and the absence of evacuation plans. If groups such as these
keep their constituency strong, build upon the organizational skills necessary to
defeat nuclear promoters, and their resilience is as undaunted as the 'system'
they work within and against; there is the possibility that the third phase of the
nuclear life-cycle, will be that of its demise. But, if those convicted to the anti
nuclear camp, become ensnared by the new 'nukespeak' with its scientific
homage to the environment, then little possibility exists for publicly instigated
change to occur, resulting in the nuclear life-cyele's rebirth. A rebirth that will
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most likely be more immune to true public intervention.
, The ways of dissenters are more than just hard, they're down right
formidable. For those who say that a Chernobyl-type accident can't happen
here, the rhetorical questions such as, What if that type of accident it did happen
here?, and What about TMI?, simply provide no sound way for dissenters to
attack the problems of nuclear technology. By asking these questions, dissenters
will receive the following answers from 'official sources', TMI was handled, no
one was hurt. and our nuclear plants are run under the close scrutiny of the
democratic system. The ramifications of both accidents continue to linger. A
report released only a few months ago stated that, 13 years after the accident at
TMI, CPU is only halfway through evaporating the radioactive water generated
by the accident..' Since the radioactive levels are still too high to send in human
clean-up crews, the Unit-2 reactor will be sealed for 20 years until the
radioactivity naturally declines. Hundreds of thousands of Russians and their
children have been dying of diseases and cancer-related illness since the
accident, their food, milk, and land will be highly contaminated for years to
come and the United States has conveniently turned its head to these horrors and
questions they do not wish to confront.
Accidents are not eliminated by governmental systems, rather their
causes and effects are distorted by political and economic forces operating to
support the agendas of the systems. "There is mounting evidence that nuclear
technologies are pushing societies in a direction that has more in common with
the visions of Orewll and Stalin than those ofJefferson."194 The nuclear
propaganda campaign in the United States provides this evidence.
194 Flavin, March 1987. p.68.
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